SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah

Utah Law Digital Commons
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship
2-2021

Social Norms in Fourth Amendment Law
Matthew Tokson
Ari Ezra Waldman

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons

Utah Law Scholarship

SOCIAL NORMS IN FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
Matthew Tokson † & Ari Ezra Waldman ‡

Courts often look to existing social norms to resolve difficult questions
in Fourth Amendment law. In theory, these norms can provide an objective
basis for courts’ constitutional decisions, grounding Fourth Amendment law
in familiar societal attitudes and beliefs. In reality, however, social norms can
shift rapidly, are constantly being contested, and frequently reflect outmoded
and discriminatory concepts. This Article draws on contemporary
sociological literatures on norms and technology to reveal how courts’
reliance on norms leads to several identifiable errors in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.
Courts assessing social norms generally adopt what we call the closure
principle, or the idea that social norms can be permanently settled. Meanwhile,
courts confronting new technologies often adopt the nonintervention principle,
or the idea that courts should refrain from addressing the Fourth
Amendment implications of new surveillance practices until the relevant
social norms become clear. Both of these approaches are flawed, and they
have substantial negative effects for equality and privacy. By adopting norms
perceived as closed, courts may embed antiquated norms in Fourth
Amendment law—norms that often involve discrimination on the basis of
race, gender, or class. By declining to intervene when norms are undeveloped,
courts cede power over norm creation to companies that design new
technologies based on data-extractive business models. Further, judicial
norm-reliance and nonintervention facilitate surveillance creep, where
familiar data-gathering infrastructures are used for new types of surveillance
and monitoring.
This Article provides, for the first time, a full, critical account of the
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role of social norms in Fourth Amendment law. It details and challenges
courts’ reliance on social norms in virtually every aspect of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. And it explores potential new directions for
Fourth Amendment law, including novel doctrinal paradigms, different
conceptions of stare decisis in the Fourth Amendment context, and
alternative institutional regimes for regulating government surveillance.
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INTRODUCTION
Social norms play a central role in Fourth Amendment law. The
Supreme Court has emphasized the “great significance given to widely shared
social expectations” and “social practice,” which can act as “a foundation of
Fourth Amendment rights.” 1 Indeed, for Fourth Amendment purposes, our
“[e]xpectations of privacy are established by general social norms.” 2 Courts’
assessments of norms drive outcomes in every aspect of Fourth Amendment
law, including searches, 3 seizures, 4 reasonable suspicion, 5 consent to search, 6
and special needs inspections performed without probable cause. 7
Social norms are the informal standards of conduct or widely accepted
behaviors that characterize a given community. 8 As such, they can give courts
an ostensibly objective basis for their Fourth Amendment decisions,
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 113 (2006). See also, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143 n.12 (1978) (stating that reasonable expectations of privacy “must have a source
outside of the Fourth Amendment,” one grounded either in property ownership or in
“understandings that are recognized and permitted by society”).
2 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (plurality op.), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See also, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9
(2013) (basing its holding on the “background social norms” that govern approaches to the
front door of a home).
3 E.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1990).
4 E.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205–06 (2002).
5 E.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000).
6 E.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006).
7 E.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1967).
8 Sanford Labovitz & Robert Hagedorn, Measuring Social Norms, 16 PACIFIC SOC. REV. 183,
184 (1973) (stating that social norms are standards of conduct that “should or should not be
followed”). See also C.A. Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and Social
Norms in Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805, 1809 (2001) (providing that norms are
activities “society holds that people should do”); ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 7
(2000) (positing that social norms are imitative behavioral patterns grounded in cooperative
relationships). Most legal scholars tie social norms to the prospect of informal social
sanctions. See Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338, 340 (1999) (stating that norms are “informal social regularities that individuals feel
obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of fear of external
nonlegal sanctions, or both.”); Robert Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 549 n.58 (1998) (“[A] norm is a rule supported by a pattern of informal
sanctions.”).
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grounding their rulings in longstanding societal practices that people know
and understand. Courts relying on social norms do not, in other words, start
from scratch—they identify and adopt existing societal attitudes towards
surveillance or police behavior and use those attitudes to chart the course of
constitutional law. 9 The conventional account of social norms in Fourth
Amendment law largely supports their use whenever feasible. 10
This Article challenges the conventional account and gives a fuller and
more nuanced picture of courts’ reliance on social norms in Fourth
Amendment law. It shows the dangers of the Fourth Amendment’s current
course, which ultimately privileges the data-extractive interests of technology
companies and government entities over individual rights.
Currently, most courts assessing social norms approach them in one of
two ways. When courts perceive that relevant social norms are stable, they
adopt what we are calling the closure principle, or the idea that social norms can
become more or less settled. In these situations, courts frequently apply
social norms to resolve Fourth Amendment cases. When courts perceive that
relevant social norms have not yet stabilized, they adopt what we call the
nonintervention principle, or the idea that courts should decline to weigh in on
new surveillance practices until the relevant social norms become clear. In
these situations, courts generally refrain from addressing the Fourth
Amendment implications of new technologies whenever possible. These
approaches are exemplified by the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Ontario
v. Quon, 11 which involved the warrantless inspection of the text messages of
government employees. 12 The Court explicitly refused to consider “farreaching” issues raised by new surveillance-enhancing technologies, arguing
that the judiciary “risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society
has become clear.” 13
This Article’s analysis, drawing on the contemporary sociological
literature on norms and technology, reveals the flaws inherent in courts’
current approaches. Social norms are neither immutable nor independent of
sociolegal institutions. They are constantly being contested, and even
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.A.
11 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
12 Id. at 750.
13 Id. at 759.
9

10
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seemingly stable norms are susceptible to gradual or rapid change. 14
Moreover, law has the capacity to alter social norms by expressing values that
influence attitudes and behavior. The expressive force of early laws limiting
where people could smoke cigarettes eventually altered social norms around
smoking, providing the impetus for greater restrictions. 15 Anti-sodomy laws,
though largely unenforced, shaped social norms by stigmatizing gay people—
and their repeal by the Supreme Court in 2003 helped to promote norms
favoring equality and acceptance. 16 In neither case were existing social norms
“closed,” and law played a vital role in shaping and improving norms going
forward.
Law also generates and influences norms surrounding new
technologies. Technologies are themselves socially constructed, as users
adapt them to existing social structures in unpredictable ways and shape their
future development. The car, the telephone, the internet, the smartphone,
and countless apps and other software have been shaped in profound ways
by law and social processes. 17
Leveraging these insights, we identify substantial flaws in Fourth
Amendment paradigms that rely on existing social norms or wait for them to
settle before intervening. First, courts adopting existing social norms can
entrench ideas that are outmoded and discriminatory. 18 Norms regarding
police-citizen interactions, which encourage voluntary interaction with police
officers and compliance with police demands, can have racially
discriminatory impacts. 19 Norms involving domestic privacy and appropriate
social behavior may have disparate gender impacts and can make it more
See infra Part II.A.
See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 607, 611 (2000) (discussing how law’s incremental approach to regulating cigarettes
effectively changed norms around smoking).
16 See infra Part II.A; Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1536 (2004); Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries
Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy,
1880–1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1069 (1997); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act
and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1729 (1993). See also Jason
Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law’s Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1039, 1041 (1999) (suggesting sodomy laws are paradigms of law’s expressive value).
17 See infra Part II.B.
18 See infra Part III.A.
19 See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203–206.
14
15
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difficult for authorities to prevent domestic abuse. 20 And norms surrounding
workplace behavior and residential buildings can discriminate against poorer
citizens or those with unstable employment situations. 21 In several important
cases, courts have based their Fourth Amendment rulings on dominant social
practices without asking why those practices exist. In doing so, they have
often embedded discriminatory norms into constitutional law.
Second, courts that decline to intervene until norms have settled
encourage unfettered government surveillance and cede norm creation to
data-extractive technology companies. Proponents of nonintervention justify
judicial neutrality by suggesting that sociotechnical norms should settle
organically, as users and designs adapt to each other, without the judiciary
putting a thumb on the scale. 22 But a thumb is already on the scale. In
practice, sociotechnical norms are not organically generated by autonomous
individuals. They are filtered through the economic interests of the most
powerful actors in the field: the companies that design those technologies.
Their business models are based on the idea that data is profit, or what
scholars have called “surveillance capitalism” or “informational capitalism.” 23
These companies carefully design and market products to encourage sharing,
to nudge consumer behavior toward disclosure, and to desensitize users to
the potential harms of surveillance. These processes influence the
development of sociotechnical norms, pushing them toward greater
acceptance of surveillance and the devaluation of privacy. By declining to get
involved in the business of norm generation, courts allow sociotechnical
norms to develop in ways that align with data-extractive interests.
Further, if courts wait for sociotechnical norms to stabilize before
regulating the government’s use of new surveillance technologies, they will
allow many forms of surveillance to go unchecked. 24 Social norms rarely
See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111–13.
See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984). Compare Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663,
1670 (2018) (holding that police officers could not enter the curtilage of a home without a
warrant), with United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
tenant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment hallway against police
presence in his hallway regardless of whether the police were trespassing).
22 E.g., Quon v. City of Ontario, 560 U.S. 747, 759 (2010).
23 See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019); JULIE COHEN,
BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER (2019).
24 Cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 526 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court should generally decline to review
how the Fourth Amendment applies to a new technology until the technology, its use, and
20
21
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definitively settle, and it may take several years or decades for technologies
and norms to stabilize even partially. 25 Until they do, the government will
have free reign to surveil citizens—and the cycle will begin anew with each
new form of technology.
Finally, judicial nonintervention facilitates “surveillance creep,” where
existing data-gathering technologies are used for new types of surveillance
and information collection. For instance, the establishment of traffic cameras
on public streets makes it easier for the government to gather facial
recognition data on passersby, because the mechanism for this surveillance
is already in place. 26 Surveillance creep can also have a powerful impact on
social norms around technology because of its ability to normalize new
surveillance as merely an extension of existing practices. Courts have been
vulnerable to this effect, often treating invasive new surveillance practices as
benign because they use familiar surveillance infrastructures. 27
Norms may still have a place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
despite these serious concerns. But rather than simply adopting norms they
perceive are settled, courts must question whether those norms are
justifiable. And courts that choose not to intervene when confronted with
new data-gathering technologies should appreciate the pro-surveillance
effects of nonintervention.
Based on our analysis, we explore new directions for Fourth
Amendment law that can allow courts to intervene effectively in novel cases
and avoid reliance on existing norms. Alternative paradigms of Fourth
Amendment law could encourage courts to look ahead at the effects of
surveillance rather than looking back at outmoded norms. Courts could
embed flexibility in Fourth Amendment law by expressly limiting the force
of stare decisis for decisions addressing new technologies, where rapid
contextual change is the rule rather than the exception. Finally, alternative
institutional arrangements for regulating government surveillance could be
adopted, with legislatures and administrative agencies working alongside
its societal implications have stabilized.”).
25 See infra Part III.B.1.
26 See infra Part III.C.
27 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (holding that undercover agents could
record conversations inside a suspect’s home on the basis of prior cases permitting agents
without recording devices); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2008)
(ruling that agents could use a device to monitor an individual’s internet and email traffic
based on a prior case permitting the use of a similar device to track dialed phone numbers).
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courts to comprehensively address new surveillance technologies. Together,
these novel approaches can help realize the promise of the Fourth
Amendment as a shield against government overreach in an era of rapidly
evolving surveillance technologies.
Our concerns about judicial adoption of the closure and
nonintervention principles are not strictly academic. Their continued use in
Fourth Amendment law poses particular risks today. State and local
governments have recently deployed industry-designed contact tracing apps
to monitor Covid-19 outbreaks, with little infrastructure in place to guard
against government use of the apps’ data for surveillance purposes. 28 Cities
are repurposing streetlight traffic cameras to surveil protesters and other law
enforcement targets. 29 Moreover, at a time when many institutions are finally
reckoning with the nation’s legacies of racism and sexism, Fourth
Amendment law’s continued embrace of antiquated norms is ripe for reform.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I surveys the conventional
theoretical account of social norms in Fourth Amendment law. It then
describes several cases across many areas that expressly rely on such norms
to determine the scope and content of the Fourth Amendment. Part II
examines the sociological literature on norms and the law’s role in shaping
them. It describes the phenomenon of social construction of technology and
defines and critiques the closure principle. Part III challenges the widespread
use of social norms in Fourth Amendment law. It evaluates the
discriminatory effects of existing norms used in several prominent cases and
analyzes the legal and social harms of judicial nonintervention in contexts
involving new technologies. Part IV explores potential new directions for
Fourth Amendment law that rely less heavily on social norms. It sets out
several alternative approaches, including new doctrinal approaches, more
flexible conceptions of stare decisis in cases involving new technologies, and
unconventional institutional regimes for regulating government surveillance.

I.

SOCIAL NORMS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The following sections review the conventional account of the role of
social norms in Fourth Amendment law. They examine some of the most
prominent cases that rely on norms to determine the scope or application of
28
29

See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
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the Fourth Amendment. They also describe the common judicial practice of
declining to intervene when norms surrounding a new technology are still in
flux. As this Part demonstrates, when courts perceive that norms are stable,
they generally adopt the closure principle; when courts perceive that norms
are unsettled, they generally adopt the nonintervention principle.
A. The Conventional Account of Social Norms
The conventional wisdom in Fourth Amendment law largely endorses
the use of social norms whenever possible. When identifiable social norms
exist, courts can draw on them as an objective, external basis for Fourth
Amendment doctrine. 30 Social norms sometimes may be difficult to discern,
but correctly identified norms offer useful guidance in an otherwise difficult
area of law. 31
Legally relevant social norms are generally thought to arise from social
practices that become accepted, repeated, and routinized over time. 32 When
people consider a prevalent social practice to be justified and beneficial, it
gains a normative edge, and may be associated with social pressures to
comply and informal sanctions for non-compliance. 33 These social norms
may eventually be embedded as law. 34 In the commercial law context, this
often takes the form of incorporating longstanding customs into the
common law of trade and contract. 35 A similar process can be observed in
Fourth Amendment law, as norms of privacy and law enforcement practice
See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 113 (2006) (stating that the Court gives
“great significance … to widely shared social expectations” and “social practice[s],” which
can act as “a foundation of Fourth Amendment rights.”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
n.12 (1978) (noting that reasonable expectations of privacy “must have a source outside of
the Fourth Amendment,” one grounded either in property ownership or in social norms,
defined as “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”); Jed Rubenfeld,
The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 107 (2008); William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment
Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 37 (2001).
31 Heffernan, supra note 30, at 37.
32 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Decentralizing Fourth Amendment Search Doctrine, 107 KY.
L.J. 169, 195 (2018).
33 Id. at 196; Heffernan, supra note 30, at 43–44.
34 Mannheimer, supra note 32, at 197–99; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part
reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.”).
35 Mannheimer, supra note 32, at 197–99.
30
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are gradually codified as constitutional law. 36
Social norms may be difficult to identify, and the Supreme Court has
given little guidance on how to assess norms for Fourth Amendment
purposes. 37 Moreover, the Court’s assessments of norms can be criticized as
inaccurate or biased in favor of the government. 38 But at least where the
Justices perceive that norms are settled, the Court has frequently used them
to determine the contours of Fourth Amendment law. 39
By contrast, in cases involving new technologies where social norms
and practices have not yet reached maturity, judges and scholars have argued
for caution. 40 In these situations, the conventional account suggests it may
be more prudent for courts to avoid deciding Fourth Amendment questions
whenever possible. 41 As the Supreme Court has warned, “[t]he judiciary risks
error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of
emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.” 42 Caution
may be especially justified, according to this account, when a technology and
the social practices surrounding it continue to change rapidly. 43 In contexts
where “it is uncertain how … norms, and the law’s treatment of them, will
evolve,” courts may avoid ruling broadly on Fourth Amendment issues and
allow social norms and practices to settle before intervening. 44 Only Justice
Scalia disagreed with this account of the role of norms in technology cases,
and even he, in other contexts, expressly endorsed the use of social norms in
setting the boundaries of Fourth Amendment protection. 45
Rubenfeld, supra note 30, at 107; Heffernan, supra note 30, at 37.
Heffernan, supra note 30, at 37.
38 Blitz, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1415.
39 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (describing how the Court in Katz
used its knowledge and experience of telephone practices to identify a reasonable
expectation of privacy in phone calls); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (1978) (“Legitimation of
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either
by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.”); Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111–113 (noting the central
importance of social understandings and practices to Fourth Amendment consent
doctrines); Kerr, supra note 24, at 539.
40 Quon, 560 U.S. at 759; Kerr, supra note 24, at 540.
41 See supra note 40.
42 Quon, 560 U.S. at 759.
43 Id. (“Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission are
evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior.”).
44 Id.
45 Id. at 768 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Jardines, 569 U.S.
36
37
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B. The Jurisprudence of Social Norms
Courts decide Fourth Amendment cases using a variety of doctrines,
precedents, and policy considerations. Social norms alone do not dictate
every Fourth Amendment outcome. However, when social norms or
practices are relevant to the issue at hand, courts frequently rely on them to
determine the course of Fourth Amendment law. This happens most often
when courts perceive those norms to be settled, stable, or “closed”.
The Supreme Court has itself characterized social norms as an objective
basis for the Fourth Amendment’s scope. A Fourth Amendment search
occurs when government officials violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 46 The Court has stated that reasonable expectations of privacy “must
have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment,” one grounded either in
property ownership or in social norms, defined as “understandings that are
recognized and permitted by society.” 47 In another case, a plurality of Justices
stated directly that “[e]xpectations of privacy are established by general social
norms.” 48 Lower courts and leading Fourth Amendment treatises have
echoed this statement, expressly tying the Fourth Amendment to
assessments of social norms. 49
The Supreme Court, for example, has drawn a line between houseguests
at 9 (“Here, the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite
him there to conduct a search.”).
46 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Supreme
Court has recently adopted a separate test that also finds a Fourth Amendment search when
a government official physically intrudes on property for the purpose of gathering
information. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 404–06 (2012). In practice, this has added little to the Katz test, and the Supreme Court
cases where it has been employed may have reached the same outcome under Katz. See
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 12–16 (Kagan, J., concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–31 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
47 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
48 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (plurality op.), overruled by United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
49 See, e.g., Raynor v. State, No. 69, 2014 WL 4216019, at *6 (Md. Aug. 27, 2014) (“[C]ommon
experience and social norms bear upon our assessment of whether one has an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular item or place. Expectations of privacy are
established by general social norms.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); 1 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(d), at 587 (5th ed. 2012) (“[I]t is necessary to look
to the customs and values of the past and present, the structure of society, the patterns of
interaction, [and] the web of norms and values.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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with privacy rights and houseguests without such rights based on its
assessments of social norms. In Minnesota v. Olson, 50 the Court concluded that
an overnight houseguest could challenge a police search of his friend’s
house. 51 The opinion engaged in a lengthy analysis of established social
customs and practices, ultimately concluding that homeowners hosting their
friends for an overnight visit typically grant their guests a measure of control
and privacy within their home. 52 The norms are different, however, for
shorter duration guests, and the Fourth Amendment accordingly offers them
less protection. 53 The Court’s detailed analyses of the social roles of host and
houseguest provided the foundation for the these Fourth Amendment
rulings. This pattern recurs in numerous Fourth Amendment scope cases. 54
495 U.S. 91 (1990).
Id. at 93.
52 Among other things, the Court stated that:
Staying overnight in another’s home is a longstanding social custom that
serves functions recognized as valuable by society. We stay in others’ homes
when we travel to a strange city for business or pleasure, when we visit our
parents, children, or more distant relatives out of town, when we are in
between jobs or homes, or when we house-sit for a friend … It is unlikely that
the guest will be confined to a restricted area of the house; and when the host
is away or asleep, the guest will have a measure of control over the premises
… The point is that hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests
of their guests, who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy despite
the fact that they have no legal interest in the premises and do not have the
legal authority to determine who may or may not enter the household.
Id. at 98–99.
53 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1998). The Carter Court concluded that there
was no identifiable social custom or norm that would extend the full protections of the home
to a person who was merely present for a short time. Id. at 90–91.
54 In Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1529 (2018), the Court held that a driver who
borrowed a rented car with the permission of the renter had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the car because social norms dictate that a friend might use a car for a variety of
legitimate reasons. Id at 1527–29. Social norms also play a central role in the leading case
applying trespass concepts to determine the Fourth Amendment’s scope. For instance,
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9, 11–12 (2013), relied on the “background social norms that
invite a visitor to the front door” to hold that police officers violated a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights when they approached his front door with a drug-sniffing dog. See also,
e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (determining that an officer’s squeezing and
manipulating the carry-on bag of a bus passenger went beyond socially acceptable practices
and was therefore a Fourth Amendment search); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100,
105 (holding that a defendant had no Fourth Amendment right in another’s handbag where
he had not known her well prior to the search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352
(basing its holding on “the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
50
51
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Likewise, in Fourth Amendment consent cases, the Court gives “great
significance … to widely shared social expectations” and “social practice[s],”
which can act as “a foundation of Fourth Amendment rights.” 55 Thus a
police officer can enter a house with the permission of only one co-tenant,
because “customary social usage” permits such entry. 56 But if another tenant
is present and objects, “commonly held understanding[s] about the authority
that co-inhabitants may exercise” dictate that the officer cannot enter. 57
Entering a house over the objection of a tenant would violate social norms
of propriety. 58
A similar reliance on social norms occurs in cases involving nonphysical seizures. 59 The norms that govern public buses, workplaces, and
interactions with police officers often determine whether a person has been
seized or not under the Fourth Amendment. 60
Finally, courts assessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures
often rely on social norms. 61 The Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed this
practice, noting that the reasonableness of a stop-and-frisk “must be based
on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” 62 Social
norms and practices play a pivotal role in other reasonableness cases as well,
especially cases involving administrative searches or suspicionless drug
testing in state-controlled settings. 63
communication.”).
55 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 113 (2006).
56 Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 303 (2014).
57 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111–13.
58 Id. at 113–14.
59 The typical Fourth Amendment seizure involves the arrest or physical detention of a
suspect. E.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
60 E.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197–98, 203-5 (2002) (relying on the
prevailing norm of cooperation with police officers to conclude that a passenger on a
Greyhound bus could have declined officers’ requests to search his bag and pat down his
clothes); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212, 218 (1984) (relying on norms of the factory floor
to conclude that immigration agents did not seize factory workers when several agents
blocked the factory exits while others, wearing badges and visible guns, questioned workers).
61 This practice arguably comports with the text and history of the Amendment itself. See
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 303 (2012) (“The word
‘unreasonable’ in the Fourth Amendment also authorizes interpreters to take evolving social
norms into account.”).
62 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
63 For instance, social norms appear to shape the outcomes of the Supreme Court’s drugtesting cases. Compare Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 & n.14 (2001) (holding
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The Supreme Court, and courts in general, do not overtly assess social
norms in every Fourth Amendment case. But when norms are relevant and
clear, courts often use them in shaping Fourth Amendment law. This process
is complicated, however, when courts attempt to address new technologies
that are not yet associated with established social norms or practices.
C. Contested Social Norms and Judicial Nonintervention
New technologies pose some of the most difficult issues in Fourth
Amendment law. 64 Modern devices and services also present a variety of
complex issues involving social norms and practices. 65 For instance, whether
information disclosed to dating apps, smart-home devices, social media, or
internet service providers is protected by the Fourth Amendment may
depend on the social customs surrounding those technologies. 66 In the face
of these complexities, courts have often struggled to effectively apply the
Fourth Amendment to new technological contexts. 67
When courts perceive that social norms surrounding a technology have
begun to harden, however, they have eagerly turned to them as objective
bases for their decisions. 68 For example, in Katz v. United States, 69 the Supreme
Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the warrantless
recording of telephone calls, with the majority emphasizing “the vital role
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.” 70 By
it was not reasonable for a state hospital to disclose pregnant women’s drug test results to
the police, partly because doing so violates the traditional understanding that the results of
diagnostic tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel), with Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (holding that it was reasonable to require high school
athletes to take random drug tests, in part because athletes were role models in the school).
64 Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039
(2016); Kerr, supra note 24, at 486; DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE
OF SURVEILLANCE (2017).
65 See Matthew Tokson, The Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV. 741 (2019).
66 See Matthew Tokson, Inescapable Surveillance, 105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(noting that the ubiquity and social importance of these services and devices may determine
whether they are protected by the Fourth Amendment under current law).
67 E.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); United States v. Graham (Graham
II), 824 F.3d 421, 429 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th
Cir. 2008).
68 See supra note 40.
69 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
70 Id. at 352.
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the time Katz was decided in 1967, it was clear that a person who entered a
telephone booth, shut its door, and paid to use the phone was entitled to
privacy—if not against visual observation, then against “the uninvited ear.” 71
The Court’s assessment came several decades after the telephone was
popularized, when the social role of the telephone was relatively stable and
mature. 72
In recent years, the Court has made similar assessments about the
ubiquity and social role of cell phones. Riley v. California, 73 which ruled that
cell phones could not be searched incident to arrest, was based on the Court’s
findings that most people depend on their cell phones and carry them
wherever they go, sometimes even in the shower. 74 Moreover, given the way
people use cell phones—to send personal communications, store
photographs, browse the internet, set their personal schedules, download an
average of 33 apps per user—they tend to contain the privacies of life. 75 The
Court relied on a similar analysis in Carpenter v. United States 76 to hold that the
Fourth Amendment required police to obtain a warrant before tracking cell
phone signals. 77
However, in cases involving new technologies around which social
practices were still indeterminate, the Court has taken a more cautious
approach. In Kyllo v. United States, 78 the Court found that the use of infrared
camera technology to scan a home required a warrant. 79 The Court added the
caveat that its decision applied when the technology at issue was not “in
general public use.” 80 Were the technology in general use, the social norms
Id.
Kerr, supra note 24, at 539. Katz also overturned a prior Supreme Court decision, Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), decided when telephone technology was not as settled
or widespread. See CLAUDE S. FISHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
TELEPHONE TO 1940, 49–50 (1994).
73 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
74 Id. at 395.
75 Id. at 394–95, 403.
76 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
77 Id. at 2221. The Court discussed in detail how people typically use their cell phones, which
had become almost a feature of human anatomy. Id. at 2218. Cell phone users
“compulsively” carry these devices around with them, and bring them everywhere they
travel, even to sensitive appointments and private meetings. Id.
78 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
79 Id. at 40.
80 Id. at 34.
71
72
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and practices surrounding it would be different, and accordingly people
might not reasonably expect privacy in their homes. 81
In City of Ontario v. Quon, 82 the Court declined to rule at all on whether
text messages sent from workplace phones are protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 83 It expressly warned of the difficulties of addressing a new
technology “before its role in society has become clear.” 84 When a
technology is mature and its social role is more defined, the Justices can rely
on their own knowledge and experience to determine the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. 85 But here, “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication
and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but
in what society accepts as proper behavior.” 86 Because it was uncertain how
the relevant social norms would evolve, the Court declined to weigh in. 87
The Supreme Court’s caution in addressing new technologies not
associated with clear social norms is also reflected in its reluctance to take
cases involving such technologies. Despite the ongoing proliferation of
information and surveillance technologies in the digital era, the Court has
decided relatively few Fourth Amendment cases outside of traditional law
enforcement contexts. 88 In recent years, the Court has declined to review
cases involving a wide variety of novel technologies, including surveillance

See Kerr, supra note 24, at 541.
560 U.S. 747 (2010).
83 See id. at 758–59. The Court did resolve the case on narrower grounds, holding that, even
if the Fourth Amendment protected work text messages, the search of Quon’s messages
were justified by the special needs of his workplace and the non-criminal purpose of the
initial review of his messages. Id. at 760–61.
84 Id. at 759.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. (“At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the law’s treatment of them,
will evolve.”).
88 For an example of this phenomenon in the Fourth Amendment search context, which is
especially affected by new surveillance technologies, see Matthew Tokson, The Emerging
Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 59 (2020).
81
82
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cameras, 89 web surfing tracking, 90 email to/from data, 91 real-time cell phone
tracking, 92 cell tower simulators, 93 cell tower dumps involving the disclosure
of every user proximate to a cell tower, 94 images uploaded to a photo storage
site, 95 and internet subscriber information. 96 Even when the Court does
resolve cases involving new technologies, it often resolves these cases on
narrow grounds, explicitly limiting the impact of its reasoning for future
cases. 97 This has significant downstream effects. Lower courts regularly cite
89 United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
567 (2016) (denying certiorari in a case involving a pole camera pointed at defendant’s
residence); United States v. Wymer 654 Fed. Appx. 735, 743 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied.
137 S. Ct. 832 (2017) (same).
90 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom., Alba v.
United States, 555 U.S. 908 (2008) (denying certiorari in a case where the government
obtained a list of IP addresses of websites a suspect had visited); United States v. Ulbricht,
858 F.3d 71, 97 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (same).
91 Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510, cert. denied sub nom., Alba, 555 U.S. at 908 (denying certiorari in a
case where the government obtained a list of emails sent to and from a suspect).
92 United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1018 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2705
(2018) (denying certiorari in a case involving real-time cell phone location tracking); United
States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760, 770 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 143 (2017) (same).
93 United States v. Sanchez-Jara, 889 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
282 (2018) (denying certiorari in a case involving simulated cell towers capable of capturing
nearby individuals’ cell phone signals); United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (same).
94 E.g., United States v. Adkinson, 916 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
2762 (2019) (denying certiorari in a case involving cell tower dumps).
95 United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 283 (2019) (denying
certiorari in a case involving the government’s searching a defendant’s images on
Imgur.com).
96 E.g., United States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, 777 F. App’x 605, 607 (4th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 876 (2020) (denying certiorari in a case involving the government’s
obtaining subscriber information associated with the defendant’s IP address).
97 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“Our decision today is a narrow
one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time [cell-site location
information (CSLI)] or … a download of information on all the devices that connected to a
particular cell site during a particular interval … Nor do we address other business records
that might incidentally reveal location information.”) (internal parenthetical marks omitted);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding that police placement of a GPS device
on a car violated the Fourth Amendment on the narrow ground that the physical touching
of the car was a quasi-trespass); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Moving Beyond Cameras in the Courtroom:
The U.S. Supreme Court, Technology, and the Media, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1901, 1934–38 (noting
the narrowness of the Court’s technology-related decisions).
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the Supreme Court’s narrowing language as a basis for denying privacy rights
in cases involving novel technologies not yet analyzed by the Court. 98

II. LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL NORMS
As we have seen, courts often decide Fourth Amendment cases by
looking to social norms. Courts assessing those norms typically perceive
them as settled and unchanging. Taking social norms as received wisdom or
as social facts of life is to adopt what we are calling the closure principle, or the
idea that social norms can be definitively settled. This Part leverages the legal
and sociological literatures on norms to argue that norms rarely permanently
stabilize, and undergo frequent contestation and change. Further, norms are
not prior to law and law has a critical role to play in nudging and creating
new norms that challenge existing surveillance and enforcement practices.
A. Law’s Influence on Social Norms
Social norms are neither immutable nor independent of the societal
institutions they frame. 99 They are constantly being contested and
reevaluated. 100 And even when they do seem to stabilize, norms are
susceptible to nudges and, less frequently, shocks. 101 Law has the capacity to
alter social norms through its expressive force and ability to reshape behavior
and social values. 102 For example, laws about marriage influence ideas about
gender, sex, and monogamy. 103 Laws protecting digital civil rights arguably
affect people’s perceptions of and willingness to engage in online
harassment. 104 And laws about police searches influence our perceptions of
E.g., United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); United States v.
Kelly, 385 F. Supp. 3d 721, 726 (E.D. Wis. 2019).
99 EMILE DURKHEIM, RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 52 (Steven Lukes ed. 1982)
(defining “social facts” as the external coercive norms that both reflect and are changed by
society).
100 Id. at 50–59.
101 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 67–68 (2008).
102 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996).
103 Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901
(2000).
104 See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 90–91 (2009) (arguing
that a civil rights agenda for online harassment would “inhibit abusive behavior” through
98
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privacy and uses of technology. 105 In this section, we push back against
judicial adoption of the closure principle by first describing the generative
relationship between law and social norms and then showing how law plays
a role in directly and indirectly defining technology’s place in society.
Legal scholars used to assume that laws and norms were separate
systems of social control. 106 For example, Robert Ellickson’s groundbreaking
study showing how residents of Shasta County, California resolved their
disputes amongst themselves using extra-legal norms painted a picture of
social norms as largely independent of law. 107 Others suggested that law and
norms played related, yet distinct roles in governing social and commercial
transactions: “warm” social norms govern ongoing commercial relationships
while “cold” law comes in as a last resort. 108
Scholars now understand that law plays a far more influential role. The
modern consensus is that, more than just parallel systems of social control,
norms and law influence each other. In particular, as Cass Sunstein argued,
law is an instrument of norm production and guidance, influencing people’s
behavior by indirectly signaling what society thinks is good or bad, moral or
evil, appropriate or not. 109 Law has an “expressive function,” 110 not just a
coercive one, that creates “cultural consequences.” 111 Laws against flag
burning, for example, are primarily expressive in character: If they ever were
to pass, these laws would have insignificant coercive effects because flag
norm generation); Danielle K. Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2009) (exploring the argument in more detail).
105 See infra Part III.
106 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach
to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1647 (1996) (arguing that law
should generally reflect social norms); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766–71
(1996) (distinguishing between relationship-preserving norms and “endgame” law).
107 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
108 See Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055,
2056 (1996) (citing INGA MARKOVITS, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: AN EAST-WEST GERMAN DIARY
44, 55 (1995)).
109 Sunstein, supra note 102, at 2022–24.
110 Id. at 2024. See also Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 39–40 (2000) (arguing for an interpretation of Equal Protection focusing on the
expressive effects of discrimination, not the intent of the state actor).
111 Richard Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936,
938 (1991).
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burning is exceedingly rare. Instead, supporters see flag burning laws as
“statement[s] about the venality of the act of flag burning, perhaps in order
to affect social norms.” 112 Laws with more tangible direct effects, including
environmental restrictions like the federal Endangered Species Act and local
composting rules, are also expressive: they are “symbol[s] of a certain
conception of the relationship between human beings and their
environments” and hope to engender eco-friendly habitual human
behavior. 113
Beyond their expressive function, law can affect norms in a variety of
ways. Dan Kahan has argued that “gentle nudges” can incrementally change
existing social norms by encouraging individuals to “revise upward their
judgment of the degree of condemnation warranted by the conduct in
question.” 114 A law that tries to create or entrench new norms through severe,
disproportionate punishments—what Kahan calls a “hard shove”—
however, could backfire. Law’s role in changing attitudes about smoking is a
notable example of the efficacy of gentle nudges. Faced with a population
for which smoking was not only ordinary but also celebrated on television,
Congress moved slowly, first requiring warning labels and then banning
television advertisements. 115 These initial steps reflected a “segmentation
strategy” that still respected individual autonomy but, at the same time,
burdened that choice to smoke with symbolic condemnation. 116 Over time,
a steadily increasing number of restrictions on smoking—where people could
smoke, how much they had to pay, and who could buy them—tapped into
growing “resentment” from nonsmokers about the dangers of second-hand
smoke that allowed the law to catalyze additional social sanctions, thereby
helping norms around smoking to resettle at point far removed from a once
pro-smoking culture. 117 Had we assumed that norms around smoking had
hardened in the 1950s, today’s television shows might still be sponsored by
Philip Morris.
Sunstein, supra note 102, at 2023.
Id. at 2024.
114 Kahan, supra note 15, at 611.
115 Id. at 626.
116 Put another way, choosing to smoke while knowing its dangers is a choice, but with
attendant moral implications. Id. at 627.
117 Id. at 627–28. Gently nudging existing social norms through incremental steps is most
likely to succeed at changing norms if the incremental rules are enforced consistently and
conspicuously. Id. at 611.
112
113
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Law, especially in the form of a bright-line rule, also clarifies
appropriate behavior when norms are vague. Elizabeth Scott gives the
example of elementary and secondary school truancy laws. 118 Scott notes that
parents had always been subject to a vague norm about educating their
children, but up until the early twentieth century, it had never been clear that
good parenting necessarily meant keeping children in school throughout their
childhood. 119 Attendance laws changed that. After their passage, parents had
a specific mandate around which they could structure their responsibilities
for educating their children. Indeed, compulsory attendance laws were
justified and sold to parents as ways to help them educate their children,
create good citizens, and become good parents themselves. 120 This education
norm, clarified by a specific legal requirement, was eventually internalized as
a hallmark of good parenting. 121
Alex Geisinger has argued that law can change our beliefs about both
the morality and practical utility of activities by “providing information or by
influencing the inferential reasoning process.” 122 Laws that mandate that
drivers wear seatbelts were effective at changing social norms because they
came alongside publicized information about the dangers of riding without
“buckling up.” Likewise, research has shown that public health interventions
that focused on increasing awareness of the harms of smoking had a
significant effect on smoking cessation rates. 123
On a more structural level, law is one of several social institutions that
set discourses of power that influence our understanding, assumptions, and
debates about social life. Discourses, as Michel Foucault explained, are the
background knowledge, ideologies, assumptions, and modes of thought
behind what we mean when we think and talk about a concept, from privacy
to sexuality. 124 For example, in describing social understandings of
Scott, supra note 103, at 1927.
Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1926-27.
122 See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 70 (2002).
123 See, e.g., Bas van den Putte, Marco C. Yzer & Suzanne Brunsting, Social Influences on Smoking
Cessation: A Comparison of the Effect of Six Social Influence Variables, 41 PREVENTATIVE MED.
186 (2005); W.H. Bruvold, A Meta-Analysis of Adolescent Smoking Prevention Programs, 83 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 872 (1993).
124 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1972); Michael Foucault,
Order of Discourse, in UNTYING THE TEXT: A POST-STRUCTURALIST READER 48-78 (Robert
Young ed., 1981).
118
119
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homosexuality, Foucault argued that, at a given time in history, our
conception of what homosexuality means is influenced by the ideas,
arguments, and language from institutions like religion (which only recently
started to see same-sex relationships and same-sex sodomy as anathematic to
religious dogma) and science (which evolved from defining homosexuality as
a disease and then, by the latter part of the Twentieth Century, the
opposite). 125 Law played a central role in defining queer people as “others,”
as well. “As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a
category of forbidden acts … .” 126 Modern criminal approaches to sodomy,
vagrancy laws, and unevenly enforced laws against public solicitation
perpetuated bourgeois discourses that marginalized gay people as
“abnormal” and kept them out of power. 127 The feminist scholars Reva
Siegal, Judith Butler, Kathleen Jones, and Catharine MacKinnon have made
similar arguments about the way law—alongside medicine, religion, and
politics—have constructed gender norms to marginalize women. 128 Adopting
the closure principle, then, can entrench the discourses of power embedded
in society by other social groups. 129
Although all of the functional mechanisms of law’s expressive value
seem to suggest that new laws generate new norms, repealing a law and
deregulating some aspect of social life can just as effectively indicate old
norms’ obsolescence and generate new social norms in their place. Since the
Supreme Court held criminal sodomy laws unconstitutional in Lawrence v.
Texas, 130 for example, attitudes toward and support for queer equality have
changed, with social norms generally favoring equality and more
acceptance. 131 Prior to Lawrence, the persistence of anti-sodomy laws
125 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1, AN INTRODUCTION
(Robert Hurley trans., 1980).
126 Id. at 90.
127 Id. at 95. See also Paul H. Gebhard et al., SEX OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF TYPES 324
(1965) (“[T]he law against adult homosexual activity is designed not for the protection of
person or property but for the enforcement of our cultural taboo against homosexuality.”).
128 See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Kathleen B. Jones, On
Authority: Or, Why Women Are Not Entitled to Speak, 29 NOMOS 152 (1987).
129 See infra Part III.A.
130 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
131 PEW RESEARCH CTR., The Partisan Divide on Political Issues Grows Even Wider: 5.
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reinforced discriminatory social norms even in the absence of
enforcement. 132 “[E]ven when unenforced,” sodomy laws “express[ed]
contempt for certain classes of citizens” 133 by establishing gay people as
presumptive criminals—or “scum,” to use the philosopher Richard Mohr’s
term 134—on the basis of their status and sexual identity alone. Janet Halley
similarly argued that maintaining sodomy laws, and the associated debates
about them, contribute to stigma and force people into the closet, stating that
“[t]he role of law in constituting persons by providing a forum for their
conflicts over who they shall be understood to be is deeply material, … it
involves … the more subtle dynamics of representation.” 135 Christopher
Leslie went even further, demonstrating how sodomy laws did violence to
queer psychological well-being, encouraged anti-queer violence, and enabled
police harassment. 136 These attacks were rationalized by sodomy law’s
expressive function: if the law said gay people were presumptive criminals,
then they did not deserve constitutional rights. 137 Throughout, law played a
central role in shaping social norms around homosexuality, first reinforcing
hostile norms and then helping to generate more positive ones.
Homosexuality, Gender, and Religion (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/10/05/5-homosexuality-gender-and-religion;
PEW RESEARCH CTR., Support for Same-Sex Marriage Grows, Even Among Groups that Had Been
Skeptical (June 26, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/06/26/support-forsame-sex-marriage-grows-even-among-groups-that-had-been-skeptical; PEW RESEARCH
CTR., Support Steady for Same-Sex Marriage and Acceptance of Homosexuality (May 12, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/12/support-steady-for-same-sexmarriage-and-acceptance-of-homosexuality. Correlation does not necessarily imply
causation, of course.
132 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 16, at 1536; Eskridge, Jr., supra note 16, at 1069. See also
Mazzone, supra note 16, at 1041 (giving sodomy laws as an exemplar of law’s expressive
value).
133 Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 421 (1999).
134 RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 60 (1988).
135 Halley, supra note 16, at 1729.
136 Leslie, supra note 16, at 103.
137 Justice Lewis Powell, who provided the swing vote to uphold anti-gay sodomy laws in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), rationalized his position by saying that the laws could
not do much harm because they were rarely enforced. His vote was a “close call” and
“probably … a mistake”, he said, but he considered it “of little or no importance” because
no one had been convicted or sent to jail. Aaron Epstein, Ex-Justice Admits ‘Mistake’ in Gay
Ruling, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATEMAN, Oct. 26, 1990, at A2. In fact, the persistence of antisodomy laws—and their attendant effects on social norms—had real negative effects for
queer people.
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B. Law and the Construction of Technology
Law also creates and modifies norms around uses of new technologies.
Smartphones, GPS, email, cloud storage, and almost any other digital
technology at issue in Fourth Amendment cases are creations of social
institutions rather than just creatures of code. 138 The ways we use them and
our expectations of privacy that attend those uses are no more “received
wisdom” than other evolving social norms. Therefore, accepting norms
around technology as stable before the law has its say is to deny law a place
in what Science and Technology Studies (STS) call the “social construction
of technology,” or SCOT, a process in which different social institutions fight
to define technology’s place in society. 139
STS scholars argue that technologies are not just discovered or built out
of raw materials or lines of code. Rather, technologies are constructed: they are
the products of human relations, understood by people, and used in daily life
in ways sometimes unintended by their designers. Technologies are social
artifacts because they are used, changed, and repurposed by people and
institutions long after they are put on the market. 140 New technologies
undergo a period of “interpretive flexibility” during which users have
different understandings of how things work and the purpose they serve,
vying to establish different social norms in the process. 141 For example, when
rural farmers, who initially resisted the automobile as a threat to their way of
life, started using the Model T as a stationary power source on their farms,

BRUNO LATOUR, THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE (Alan Sheridan & John Law trans.,
1993); Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and
the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION AND BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE? 196–229 (John Law ed., 1987) (1984); Michel Callon, The Sociology of an ActorNetwork: The Case of the Electric Vehicle, in MAPPING THE DYNAMICS OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 19–34 (Michel Callon et al. eds., 1986); BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN
ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1988).
139 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (Wiebe E. Bijker et al. eds., 2012).
140 Trevor J. Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: Or How the
Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other, in Wiebe E. Bijker,
Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch eds., THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF
TECHNOLOGY 17-50 (1987).
141 See CYNTHIA COCKBURN & SUSAN ORMROD, GENDER AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE
MAKING 1-15 (1993)
138
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they became “agents of technological change.” 142 Farmers used cars to power
lights and machinery and to transport goods rather than people. Designers
and manufacturers who resisted using the car as a simple power source tried
to counteract this: they elevated the car’s rear wheels to make it difficult to
double as a stable power source and built and marketed separate gasoline
engines that could provide power when needed. 143 As a result, farmers
created norms that influenced the next iteration of the car and spurred the
creation of new products.
The telephone, surprisingly enough, was not intended to be a tool of
social communication when it was first built. The enterprises that built the
first phones designed them purely for businesses or government agencies to
transmit information over long distances. As Michele Martin describes, rural
women had a different idea. They used telephones to create the social contact
they lacked under a patriarchal system that kept women in the home. Their
norms forced changes in design of both the phones themselves and the wires
that made communication possible. 144 Bijker has shown that when the highwheeled bicycle was introduced, older men tried to establish a norm of
nonuse, designating it as unsafe. This which paved the way for the
development of a new, safer, smaller-wheeled bicycle several years later. 145 In
all of these contexts, consumers identified new uses for products that
designers never intended, ultimately leading to changes in design. 146
Law is one of the social institutions involved in the social construction
of technology. Law undoubtedly affects technology design. Intellectual
property, tort, and products liability law, among other areas, directly affect
how technologies are made. For instance, patent and copyright law
encourages innovators to “invent around” or “create around” others’ designs
and hold creators liable for infringement when they get too close to an
existing product. 147 Trade secrecy law influences how competing products are
Ronald Kline & Trevor Pinch, Users as Agents of Technological Change: The Social Construction
of the Automobile in the Rural United States, 37 TECH. & CULTURE 763, 764 (1996).
143 Id. at 775–84.
144 MICHELLE MARTIN, HELLO, CENTRAL?: GENDER TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE IN THE
FORMATION OF TELEPHONE SYSTEMS 5–9 (1991).
145 WIEBE E. BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES, AND BULBS: TOWARD A THEORY OF
SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1995).
146 See, e.g., SUSAN DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING, 1899–1922 (1987)
(users developed new ways to deploy radio technology).
147 See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1351–358
142
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designed: reverse engineering is permissible, but not if it is based on
unlawfully obtained information. 148 Tort law has generated a series of
behavioral standards that define how companies design, manufacture, and
market products. 149
We already see law directly influencing the designs and norms of
information technologies, as well. When the information industry introduced
end-to-end encryption and eliminated so-called “back doors” that
governments could use to access information on smartphones and other
platforms, the U.S. Department of Justice pushed back, citing national
security concerns. 150 Law enforcement attempted to use the All Writs Act to
force Apple to design a “back door” into the iPhone owned by the domestic
terrorist who killed 14 people at a San Bernardino community center in
2015. 151 The General Data Protection Regulation, the European Union’s
comprehensive data privacy law, and the California Consumer Privacy Act, a
structurally similar privacy law that took effect on January 1, 2020, both
guarantee individuals the right to access information about them stored by
data collectors. 152 Those provisions have required companies to redesign
their databases and user interfaces to allow data requests, searches, and
transmission. 153 In addition, as nations tried to use technology-enhanced
(2015) (discussing the principles of “inventing” or “creating” around in patent and copyright
law).
148 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Do You Want to Know a Trade Secret? How Article 2B
Will Make Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (But Innovation More Difficult), 87 CAL. L. REV. 191, 207
(1999) (“misappropriation does not include reverse engineering”).
149 See, e.g., Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 1046 (4th Cir. 1983); Lewis v. Timco,
Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1429 (5th Cir. 1983); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y.
1975); Barker v. Lull Eng’g, 573 P.2d 443, 457 (Cal. 1978); John W. Wade, On the Effect in
Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 739 (1983).
150 Encryption: The Threat, Applications and Potential Solutions (visited July 24, 2020),
http://www.epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/mandatory.gif (showing scanned copy of the
briefing document provided to the National Security Council).
151 Gov’t’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities, In re Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone
Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License
Plate 35KGD203 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2016) (No. 16-10), at 1.
152 See Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, May 4, 2016,
2016 O.J. (L 119); Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (West 2018) [hereinafter “GDPR”].
153 See Niall McCreanor, How to Maintain GDPR-Compliant Databases, IT GOVERNANCE (Feb.
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contact tracing to manage outbreaks during the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic,
privacy law in Europe and privacy regulators in the United States facilitated
the creation of decentralized tracing apps that preserved some level of
privacy while allowing health experts to track Covid hotspots. 154
Privacy law does this as well by influencing norms around sharing and
design. Danielle Citron has argued that creating special legal protections for
sexual privacy can encourage people to value their privacy when downloading
menstruation apps or disclosing HIV status on a dating app. 155 One of us has
written that privacy law could help generate and protect norms of trust
among individuals. 156 And Margot Kaminski has suggested that one of the
goals of compliance requirements in the GDPR, including privacy impact
assessments and other internal structures, is to nudge behavioral and design
norms inside the information industry. 157 These are just a few examples of
how law is part of the process by which new technologies are interpreted,
constructed, and understood in society.

III. CHALLENGING NORM RELIANCE AND JUDICIAL
NONINTERVENTION IN FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
Where norms seem stable and settled, they often define our Fourth
Amendment rights; where norms appear to be in flux, they are left to evolve
on their own, free of judicial intervention. That is our descriptive claim. In
this Part, we make our normative claim: Both of these practices substantially
16,
2018),
https://www.itgovernance.eu/blog/en/how-to-maintain-gdpr-compliantdatabases.
154 See Stephanie Rossello & Pierre Dewitte, Anonymization by Decentralization? The Case of
COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps, EUROPEAN LAW BLOG (May 25, 2020),
https://europeanlawblog.eu/2020/05/25/anonymization-by-decentralization-the-case-ofcovid-19-contact-tracing-apps.
155 Danielle Keats Citron, A New Compact for Intimate Information, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020); Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1889–90
(2019) [hereinafter Citron, Sexual Privacy].
156 ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE (2018); Ari Ezra Waldman, Safe Social Spaces, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1537
(2018). See also Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for
Privacy Law (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript on file with authors).
157 Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic
Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1584 (2019).
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weaken the ability of the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy, security, and
equality in the information age.
As discussed above, law not only draws on social norms but also shapes
them, in an ongoing exchange between social institutions and individuals.
Courts deciding Fourth Amendment cases have often failed to appreciate the
expressive function of law and its role in driving norms. Courts regularly take
norms to be settled, even in areas where they are contested or directly
influenced by legal standards.
This failure of understanding leads to concrete judicial errors in the
Fourth Amendment context. First, courts may embed outmoded norms in
Fourth Amendment law, even as many of those norms discriminate on the
basis of race, gender, or class. Second, courts often refrain from addressing
government surveillance when the norms surrounding a new technology are
unsettled. This practice allows the government to surveil citizens without
regulation for years or decades. Moreover, it cedes power over norm
development to companies that design new technologies based on an
extractive data-for-profit business model, thus skewing social norms toward
disclosure and away from privacy. Finally, both the closure and
nonintervention principles described above facilitate “surveillance creep,”
where existing data-gathering structures are used for new types of
surveillance.
Relying on the sociolegal and STS literatures described above, we
challenge the principles of closure and nonintervention that drive these
judicial errors. The following sections detail how courts have embedded
discriminatory norms, ceded power over norm development to dataextractive businesses, and failed to anticipate the gradual accretion of
government surveillance infrastructure.
A. The Problem of Discriminatory Norms
Social norms are rarely fully settled and are subject to contestation
and change. Norms surrounding race, gender, class, and related issues are
particularly likely to be challenged and to shift over time. Courts applying
“settled” social norms are thus at risk of reifying outmoded, discriminatory
concepts. This section explores this process, detailing how courts’ seemingly
neutral applications of existing norms have embedded discriminatory ideas
in Fourth Amendment law.
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1. Racially Discriminatory Norms
Courts basing Fourth Amendment law on prevailing social customs
may entrench discriminatory norms that disadvantage citizens of color. In
the Supreme Court’s norm-based Fourth Amendment cases, the Court often
looks to social practices as an objective basis for rules governing policecitizen interactions. Its assessments of prevailing social customs may be
empirically accurate—most people may act as the Court predicts. But the
very act of enshrining social norms in constitutional law can reinforce
discriminatory norms and make it more difficult for citizens to challenge
them.
In Illinois v. Wardlow, 158 the Court concluded that the police could stopand-frisk a Black suspect who ran away after seeing several police cars. 159 The
police made a “commonsense judgement[]…about human behavior,” the
Court said, and found that running away from police was suspicious and
indicative of wrongdoing. 160 Several Justices in dissent pointed out that Black
people have legitimate fears of police brutality and other harms stemming
from police interaction that may cause them to flee at the sight of officers
even without having done anything wrong. 161 But the majority concluded that
Wardlow’s fleeing behavior was sufficiently unusual as to arouse suspicion,
and thus the officers’ actions were justified. 162
Empirical studies cast doubt on the idea that people fleeing the police
are regularly engaged in wrongdoing. 163 But the problem here is not the
Court’s empirical conclusion about how usual it is for a person to run away
528 U.S. 119 (2000).
Id. at 121.
160 Id. at 125.
161 Id. at 132–33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For further discussion
of Wardlow and the reasons Black citizens may have for fleeing the police, see Tovah Renee
Calderon, Race-Based Policing from Terry to Wardlow: Steps Down the Totalitarian Path, 44 HOW.
L.J. 73, 101–02 (2000).
162 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25. The Court also reasoned that police stops were relatively
“minimal” intrusions that could be justified by a relatively low level of individualized
suspicion. Id. at 126.
163 Tracey L. Meares & Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social
Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733, 790
(2000) (reporting that suspects who fled upon seeing the police were arrested in only 1 out
of every 15.8 encounters, and suspects who fled the police in high-crime areas, like Wardlow,
were arrested in only 1 out of every 45 encounters).
158
159
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after seeing the police. It is the Court’s failure to question prevailing social
practices of police-citizen interaction, particularly with respect to persons of
color, before embedding them in constitutional law. Running away upon
seeing a police officer is likely rare overall in part because of substantial racial
disparities in police treatment of civilians. 164 White people have less reason
to fear police brutality or degradation, and thus less reason to run away. 165
Black people may decline to run away in most cases not because they are
unafraid of the police but because they fear even more what the police will
do to them if they flee. 166 Declining to run may also reflect parental advice to
children of color that discourages running in the view of a police officer and
counsels maximal compliance in order to minimize the risk of being harmed
by the police. 167 The Court, in other words, bases Fourth Amendment law
on a prevailing social practice without asking why that practice exists. Nor
does it ask whether the law should work to change that practice. In doing so,
it embeds into constitutional law a practice with racially disparate effects.
In Drayton v. United States, 168 several police officers boarded a
Greyhound bus, guarding the exits, while one officer asked to search
Drayton’s bag and pat-down his clothes. 169 The Court’s conclusion that this
was not a seizure rested on the idea that bus passengers would generally feel
free to decline police requests to search their bags and would leave the bus if
they wanted to terminate the encounter. 170 The Court noted that most people
complied with such requests, presumably out of a desire to promote law
enforcement and enhance safety. 171 Setting aside whether the Court was
correct about the prevailing social practice of complying with police search
requests, the Court failed to examine why this social norm exists.
Like other members of traditionally marginalized groups, Black people
may be especially reluctant to challenge police authority or decline police
See, e.g., Diana R. Donahoe, Not-So-Great Expectations: Implicit Racial Bias in the Supreme
Court’s Consent to Search Doctrine, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 619, 637 (2018).
165 MALCOLM D. HOLMES & BRAD SMITH, RACE AND POLICE BRUTALITY: ROOTS OF AN
URBAN DILEMMA 28–35 (2008).
166 See I. Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 653,
696–98 (2018).
167 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
168 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
169 Id. at 197–98.
170 Id. at 203–4, 206.
171 Id. at 205.
164
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requests in a situation like the one in Drayton, where Drayton, a Black man,
was surrounded by officers in a confined space. 172 Black children are often
counseled by parents and other trusted figures to defer to the police as much
as possible, not to move or flee, and to comply with every request. 173 Thus a
standard like Drayton’s, which depends on a person refusing to talk to police
officers or brushing past them to leave a bus, may be harmful to people of
color who cannot assert their rights to noncompliance with police requests
without risking serious harm or trauma. 174 Moreover, psychological studies
of consent in law enforcement contexts suggest that the general norm of
compliance with police search requests is motivated by intimidation rather
than the voluntary choices of citizens. 175
Even if a court ultimately concludes that the coercive pressure of police
bus interdiction is justified by the benefits of searching passengers’ bags, 176 it
cannot do so without addressing the disparate racial and ethnic impacts of
such an approach. 177 Yet the Court never grapples with these normative
questions, instead choosing to identify a prevailing social practice and adopt
it as settled.
2. Gender-Discriminatory Norms
Fourth Amendment standards that depend on individuals refusing to
comply with police officers likewise disadvantage women relative to men.
Survey data suggests that women feel less free to leave police-citizen
encounters and may feel the coercive pressure of such encounters more than
others. 178 Linguistic patterns correlated with gender may also result in
women, particularly women of color, being less direct with authority figures
in ways that may disadvantage them under facially neutral standards of
See, e.g., Carbado, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1013–14.
See Donahoe, supra note 164, at 642–43.
174 Carbado, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1018–20.
175 See, e.g., Roseanna Summers & Vanessa K. Bohns, The Voluntariness of Voluntary Consent:
Consent Searches and the Psychology of Compliance, 128 YALE L.J. 1962 (2019).
176 It is notable that Drayton was argued only 6 months after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
which may have influenced the Court’s policy intuitions. It is impossible to know for certain
because the Court does not address these issues, instead basing its decisions in norms and
practices.
177 See Carbado, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 966–67.
178 David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure
Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 75–76 (2009).
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normal police-citizen interaction. 179
Moreover, the jurisprudence of consent searches of homes may
reinforce existing norms of domestic privacy at the expense of deterring
domestic abuse. The multiple opinions in Georgia v. Randolph parallel an
ongoing feminist debate about privacy and domestic abuse without actually
addressing it. 180 Some theorists have argued against the concept of domestic
privacy, contending that it provides a cover for physical and psychological
abuse. 181 Others have argued that once the law takes a full account of the
privacy and bodily integrity interests of women, the law’s general concern for
domestic privacy need not shield abusers or prevent government officials
from scrutinizing the home in appropriate circumstances. 182 The Supreme
Court largely elided this debate by focusing on social norms and concluding
that prevailing norms discourage entering a dwelling when a tenant of that
dwelling is present and objects to one’s entry. 183 The Justices were aware of
the domestic abuse issue at the time of their decision. 184 But in setting a
general standard, the Court concluded that it should follow its typical practice
of giving “great significance … to widely shared social expectations” and
“social custom” in Fourth Amendment consent cases. 185
Adopting these social norms, however well intentioned, enshrines them
in constitutional law without fully addressing their gendered burdens and
See Jesse-Justin Cuevas & Tonja Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2170–74 (2016).
180 See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 557, 575–82 (2006).
Compare CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
THE LAW 93, 101–02 (1987) and Reva B. Siegel, ‘The Rule of Love:’ Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996), with Citron, Sexual Privacy, supra note 155, at 1876–77;
ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS (1988).
181 See literature cited supra note 180. See also, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 457 (1868)
(establishing a principle of legal nonintervention into marital privacy in a case where a
husband struck his wife with a rod).
182 See supra note 180.
183 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111–12.
184 See id. at 139 (Roberts, J., dissenting). The majority made clear that the police could enter
a home over the objection of a co-tenant in order to protect a resident from imminent
domestic violence. Id. at 118. In a subsequent case, police officers did enter a home over the
objection of a present tenant when they suspected domestic abuse, arrested the abuser, and
then obtained consent from the victim to search the house. See Fernandez v. California, 571
U.S. 292, 295–96 (2014). In less clear-cut cases, the ability of officers to intervene in domestic
disputes may be limited.
185 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.
179
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implications for victims and survivors of abuse. While the police would be
able to enter a house in situations of domestic violence, they may not, under
Randolph, be able to do so in cases where violence is not imminent or where
the signs of abuse are too ambiguous to allow for entry on the basis of an
emergency aid exception. 186 Likewise, the Randolph rule prohibits police
involvement in cases of domestic strife that may act as a precursor to abuse
or may implicate child custody. 187
Randolph’s protection of domestic privacy and reluctance to involve
police officers in non-abusive domestic disputes may ultimately represent the
optimal approach to Fourth Amendment consent law. But the Court’s
adoption of prevailing social norms cuts short any discussion of the broader
implications of its ruling. The Court privileges a norm of social behavior that
was developed when gender relations were substantially different than they
are today and when women’s rights to autonomy and bodily integrity in the
domestic context were devalued. 188 Endorsing norms simply because of their
longstanding nature or general acceptance risks embedding discriminatory
norms in constitutional law.
3. Class-Discriminatory Norms
Courts’ adoptions of existing social customs in Fourth Amendment law
can also embed norms that systematically disadvantage poorer citizens and
privilege those with more money or property. Class-discriminatory norms
may also have racially disparate impacts, doubly disadvantaging poor people
of color. 189 The cases adopting these norms uncritically adopt prevailing
social practices and entrench stereotypes about wealth and power.
For example, while courts have held that individuals have a Fourth
Amendment interest in the yards surrounding their detached homes or the
See Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy A Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 503 (2009).
Indeed, the reason for the initial phone call to the police in Randolph was Scott Randolph’s
taking his and Janet Randolph’s son out of the house to live elsewhere. Randolph, 547 U.S. at
107.
188 The social norm of non-entry over the objection of a tenant likely stretches back decades
or centuries, and Randolph points to related legal authorities from the 1960s, 1950s, and
before. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 112–14 (citing Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 610
(1961); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§
468, 473, 474, pp. 297, 307-309 (3d ed. 1939 and 2006 Cum. Supp.)).
189 See Eric J. Miller, Property, Persons, and Institutionalized Police Interdiction in Byrd v. United
States, 52 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 107, 156 (2018).
186
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shared areas of small multi-unit homes, 190 courts typically hold that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect the hallways of larger apartment
buildings. 191 This distinction is based on courts’ perceptions of the social
practices surrounding these areas. A homeowner “exercises greater control”
over their yard than apartment dwellers do over their hallways, and, because
larger apartments generally receive more visitors, the “more units in the
apartment building … the less reasonable any expectation of privacy.” 192 This
might be a defensible assessment of social practices, although visitors and
delivery people may intrude on a homeowner’s yard as well. 193 But this
distinction discriminates between those who own detached houses and those
who cannot afford such houses (or simply wish to live in cities) and must
share their living spaces with others. The former are likely wealthier, and they
are given stronger privacy rights. Courts could just as plausibly find that all
dwellings are surrounded by a private area, typically open to a limited set of
guests and visitors, and off-limits to warrantless police surveillance. 194
Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation
when police officers entered a home’s curtilage to examine a motorcycle parked there);
United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 1976) (“In light of the size of the building,
then, we find significant the fact that the door to the hallway giving access to the two
apartments was locked; the two lower-level tenants thus exercised considerably more control
over access to that portion of the building than would be true in a multi-unit complex, and
hence could reasonably be said to have a greater reasonable expectation of privacy than
would be true of occupants of large apartment buildings.”); Fixel v. Wainwright, 493 F.3d
480, 483–84 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that a police officer’s unwarranted inspection of the
shared back yard of a 4-unit apartment house violated the Fourth Amendment).
191 United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The vestibule and
other common areas are used by postal carriers, custodians, and peddlers.”); United States
v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977) (“The common hallways of Hoff’s apartment
building were available for the use of residents and their guests, the landlord and his agents,
and others having legitimate reasons to be on the premises.”). See also United States v.
Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in
an apartment hallway); United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1989)
(same), abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). But see United
States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that uninvited police entry into the
hallway of a locked apartment building violated the Fourth Amendment on quasi-trespass
grounds).
192 United States v. Miravalles, 280 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2002).
193 Id. at 1332.
194 Indeed the leading case on drug-sniffing dogs points in this direction, although its
rationale is difficult to square with the many cases declaring that there is no Fourth
Amendment interest in a shared hallway. See United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 853
190
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Instead, subtle distinctions between the social practices surrounding yards
and hallways have driven the case outcomes, despite their disparate
impacts. 195
The Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Delgado 196 likewise enshrined
class-discriminatory norms in the context of immigration enforcement at a
garment factory. 197 The Court concluded that placing armed agents near the
factory’s exits did not constitute a seizure of the workers inside. 198 This
holding was based on the Court’s assessment of the typical social practices
of a factory. It found that “when people are at work their freedom to move
about has been meaningfully restricted … by the worker’s voluntary
obligations to their employers.” 199 While this may be an accurate assessment
of the practices of many garment factories, where workers may have little
bargaining power and may face excessive work demands and restrictions on
personal breaks, it endorses an aggressively anti-worker norm. 200 The
rationale of Delgado is that workers are already obligated to remain inside the
factory for the duration of the workday, with little enough personal freedom
that the additional restrictions imposed by armed guards do not rise to the
level of a Fourth Amendment seizure. 201 The Court adopts this norm as a
lodestar of Fourth Amendment law without questioning its appropriateness
or desirability. In doing so, it reinforces disciplinary workplace norms and
further undermines workers’ power relative to their employers. It also places
disproportionate burdens on Latinx workers and may reduce their relative
(7th Cir. 2016).
195 E.g., Miravalles, 280 F.3d at 1332 (“[T]enants have little control over those areas, which
are available for the use of other tenants, friends and visitors of other tenants, the landlord,
delivery people, repair workers, sales people, postal carriers and the like.”); Concepcion, 942
F.2d at 1172 (“The vestibule and other common areas are used by postal carriers, custodians,
and peddlers.”); Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816 (“The common hallways of Hoff’s apartment building
were available for the use of residents and their guests, the landlord and his agents, and
others having legitimate reasons to be on the premises.”).
196 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
197 Id. at 212; Carbado, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 994.
198 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212.
199 Id. at 218.
200 See generally Note, Leslie D. Alexander, Fashioning a New Approach: The Role of International
Human Rights Law in Enforcing Rights of Women Garment Workers in Los Angeles, 10 GEO. J. PUB.
POL’Y 81, 83–87 (2003) (discussing inhumane conditions and excessive work obligations in
garment factories).
201 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.
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status as workers. 202 The Court’s adoption of existing workplace norms can
have harmful legal and social implications for workers along several
dimensions.
B. The Effects of Nonintervention
The previous section discussed how courts applying the closure
principle have ignored law’s role in nudging norms and entrenched in Fourth
Amendment law unjust and outdated norms about race, gender, and
socioeconomic status. The flip side of closure is nonintervention, where
courts remain neutral when they perceive that social norms—particularly
those about the uses of surveillance technologies—are still in flux. Judicial
insistence on nonintervention where norms are perceived to be unsettled—
what we are calling the nonintervention principle—cedes power to private
companies that design new technologies to surveil users rather than protect
their privacy. The norms these companies favor are almost always surveillant,
powered by the data-extractive business models of informational
capitalism. 203 In addition, nonintervention often permits the government to
surveil individuals using new technologies for years or decades without
meaningful legal regulation.
1.

Nonintervention and Government Surveillance

In general, choosing not to act is a choice like any other. It has both
consequences and moral valence, and reflects the normative judgment of the
decisionmaker. 204 Judicial nonintervention is also a choice, one that can
perpetuate existing injustices. 205 For example, judicial adherence to a
decontextualized form of race and sex neutrality has often undermined
Carbado, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 998.
COHEN, supra note 23.
204 For a general theoretical discussion of choosing not to choose, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L.J. 1, 5–8 (2014).
205 This sentiment is often restated in movements for social justice. For example, Desmond
Tutu said, “If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the
oppressor.” Gary Younge, The Secrets of a Peacemaker, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/may/23/interview-desmond-tutu. To be sure,
judicial nonintervention can often promote social justice as effectively as intervention, or
even more so. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2nd ed. 2008).
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prospects for justice. 206 Similarly, when courts stay out of the fray entirely,
they may let political majorities entrench their own power at the expense of
minority voters. 207
Proponents of judicial nonintervention in Fourth Amendment law
suggest that courts should refrain from regulating the government’s use of a
new surveillance technology until social norms and practices involving the
technology become stable. 208 Under this laissez faire regime, norms
surrounding emerging technologies should be allowed to develop free of
judicial input. 209 A result of this is that government officials would be allowed
to surveil citizens without Fourth Amendment regulation in the long interim
period between the development of a new technology and the development
of relatively stable social norms. As courts wait for a technology and its
associated norms to settle, nonintervention in surveillance cases will typically
mean declining to reach the merits of a Fourth Amendment issue, ruling
narrowly, or, at the Supreme Court level, simply denying certiorari. 210
Historically, for instance, nonintervention permitted even severe forms of domestic
abuse. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 457 (1868).
207 In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Roberts Court interpreted the political question doctrine to
mandate nonintervention in partisan gerrymandering claims. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2501–02
(2019). Notwithstanding the dissent’s step-by-step approach for adjudication, the Court left
the work of overturning partisan gerrymanders to the political sphere. See id. at 2508–2525
(Kagan, J., dissenting). But gerrymanders are designed to prevent political checks; they
entrench the power of one party (or group) against popular will. Judicial nonintervention in
partisan gerrymandering cases, then, leaves minority parties with nowhere to turn,
perpetuating the unequal status quo.
208 See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“The judiciary risks error by
elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before
its role in society has become clear.”); Kerr, supra note 24, at 539 (“If a court intervenes too
soon, it risks error: it might wrongly assess the need for adjustment because either the
technology hasn’t evolved to a reasonably stable state or else social practices relating to the
use of the technology continue to evolve.”).
209 See supra note 208.
210 Lower courts have several means of avoiding difficult Fourth Amendment issues,
including dismissing cases on standing, good faith, qualified immunity, or similar grounds.
See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and Standing Can
No Longer Logically Coexist, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1670 (2007) (giving a general
theoretical account of modern standing doctrine); Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the
Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1084–87 (2011) (surveying the Supreme
Court’s good faith exception jurisprudence). Lower courts might also rule narrowly, or reach
a ruling only in unpublished, nonprecedential decisions, where permitted by local rules. See,
e.g., Wash. Gen. R. 14.1 (establishing that unpublished opinions of the Washington Court of
206
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This approach is problematic because norms rarely definitively settle, 211
and it may take several years or decades for technologies and norms to
stabilize even partially. 212 The period of “interpretive flexibility” surrounding
a new technology is often quite long, as different social groups and actors
fight to adapt new technologies to their needs, values, and worldviews. It
took the bicycle nearly 100 years to evolve from its first iterations to suit the
needs of different social groups. 213 The telephone is still evolving. 214 By the
time sociotechnical norms stabilize, if they do at all, the government will have
had free reign to surveil citizens for a long time.
Proponents of nonintervention have argued that the Supreme Court’s
erroneous ruling in Olmstead v. United States, which upheld warrantless
wiretapping, was the result of the Court intervening too fast to rule on a
relatively new form of surveillance. 215 They suggest that the Court could
instead have waited another twenty or thirty years as “the use of the
telephone in communications continued to change throughout the 1930s,
1940s, and 1950s.” 216 But declining to intervene for several decades would
have given the government the ability to massively surveil citizens without
judicial supervision throughout that time, rendering the Fourth Amendment
toothless. 217 Moreover, both the telephone and the practice of wiretapping
had been around and were well-known for decades prior to Olmstead. 218 The
Appeals “have no precedential value”).
211 See supra Part II.A.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 140–146.
213 See BIJKER, supra note 145.
214 See W.H. Martin, Seventy-Five Years of the Telephone: An Evolution in Technology, 30 BELL SYS.
TECH. J. 215 (1951); Lisa Eadicicco, This Is Why the iPhone Upended the Tech Industry, TIME,
June 29, 2017, https://time.com/4837176/iphone-10th-anniversary.
215 Kerr, supra note 24, at 539.
216 Id.
217 Six years after Olmstead, Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934 which limited
the disclosure of wiretapping evidence in court, but did not effectively deter widespread use
and abuse of wiretapping over the following decades. See Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1104 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006)); Matthew
Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 592 (2011) (describing
the widespread abuses that occurred the during the decades that followed the passage of the
Communications Act of 1934).
218 The telephone was patented in 1876, some fifty-two years prior to Olmstead, U.S. Patent
No. 174,465 (issued Mar. 7, 1876), while wiretapping had been used since 1895, thirty-three
years prior to Olmstead. Meyer Berger, Tapping the Wires, THE NEW YORKER, June 18, 1938.
Wiretapping had been brought to public attention by at least 1916, twelve years before
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Court’s error in Olmstead was not the result of technological unfamiliarity or
a failure to wait for norms to settle, but rather of excessive formalism and
textual literalism. 219
By failing to intervene when issues of technological surveillance arise,
courts would allow government surveillance to go unchecked by the Fourth
Amendment for years or decades. Further, by the time sociotechnical norms
become relatively stable, the government may have already moved on to a
new surveillance practice, beginning the cycle again. As the next section
explores, nonintervention can also facilitate the creation of anti-privacy
norms by ceding norm development to private entities with business models
built on data extraction.
2.

Informational Capitalism and Anti-Privacy Norms

Courts’ absence from the social construction of new technologies
amplifies designers’ power to set sociotechnical norms. Design can influence,
nudge, and predetermine our disclosure behavior by triggering the heuristics
we use to make decisions. 220 When design makes things easier to do (like
disclosing personal information), we do more of it; when design makes things
harder to do (like protect our privacy), we do less of it. 221 Design also
expresses values, telling the stories designers want by controlling their
technology’s “semantic architecture.” 222
Design is, in other words, a means of exercising power. 223 As Woodrow
Olmstead. Id.
219 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473–74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s rigidity
in addressing novel government surveillance under a strict textualist approach).
220 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT 26–30
(2018).
221 CLIVE THOMPSON, CODERS: THE MAKING OF A NEW TRIBE AND THE REMAKING OF
THE WORLD 11 (2019).
222 MARY FLANAGAN & HELEN NISSENBAUM, VALUES AT PLAY IN DIGITAL GAMES (2014).
223 As Langdon Winner argued, it is difficult to understand design independent of its coercive
capacities and political dynamics. Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 Daedalus
121 (1980). See also, e.g., Mary Flanagan et al., Embodying Values in Technology: Theory and Practice,
in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 322 (Jeroen van der Hoven &
John Weckert, eds., 2008); BATYA FRIEDMAN & DAVID G. HENDRY, VALUE SENSITIVE
DESIGN: SHAPING TECHNOLOGY WITH MORAL IMAGINATION (2019); Julie E. Cohen,
Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 223 (2007); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex
Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553,

37

Hartzog notes, “[t]he realities of technology at scale mean that the services
we use must necessarily be built in a way that constrains our choices.” 224 We
can only click on the buttons or select the options presented to us; we can
only opt-out of the options from which a website allows us to opt-out.
The power of design is generally leveraged to increase data collection,
use, and processing. That is what “informational capitalism” refers to: a
political economy where data equals profit. 225 Scholars have argued that this
need for data stems from the marketing industry’s quest to better predict
consumer responses to advertisements. With the popularization of the World
Wide Web, marketers sliced and diced populations into as many latent
characteristics as possible so as to better “understand” what consumers
want. 226 Likewise, it is in the economic interests of tech industry executives
to guide the design process toward surveillance. Executives at public
companies also have legal obligations to pursue profits for shareholders,
further incenting data extraction. 227 For their part, many software engineers,
a necessarily powerful group because of the position they occupy at the
center of design’s translation from concept to code, are rarely trained in nor
are particularly cognizant of privacy. 228 The incentives and attitudes of those
doing the work of design and those directing the process from the C-Suite
prejudice design against privacy from the beginning. We see this throughout
the digital ecosystem. Many smartphone apps collect geolocation data for no
reason; 229 interfaces encourage disclosure and frame sharing in a positive
light; 230 so-called “dark patterns” take advantage of our preference for shiny

554–55 (1997).
224 Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 423,
426 (2018).
225 See COHEN, supra note 23.
226 See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS
DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH (2011); JOSEPH TUROW, BREAKING UP
AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND THE NEW MEDIA WORLD (1998).
227 Lina Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 497 (2019).
228 Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 659 (2018).
229 See, e.g., Tim Sampson, Popular Flashlight App Secretly Collected and Sold Users’ Location Data,
DAILY DOT (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/flashlight-app-collects-sellslocation-data.
230 Leslie K. John et al., Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive
Information, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 858 (2011).
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colorful buttons over grey ones; 231 platforms nudge us to buy products others
have bought before us; 232 and apps gamify sharing by encouraging us to
continue a ‘streak’ with our friends. 233
In many cases, users have little power to react in ways contrary to or
inconsistent with design. 234 Design, therefore, is a powerful norm generator.
As Hartzog explains, “[o]nce design affects our perceptions, it begins to
shape our behavior. Once it shapes our behavior, it can be used to control
us because it shapes what we perceive as ‘normal.’” 235 Therefore, courts that
adopt the nonintervention principle leave the arena in which social norms
are contested to these powerful forces of design, almost all of which privilege
surveillance over privacy.
Technology companies also market their products to encourage
sharing. Social platforms promise to “bring people together,” but only if
users share their likes and dislikes. 236 Dating apps advertise the most accurate
matches, but only if users answer hundreds of intimate questions. 237 The
Dark patterns are design tricks that manipulate us into taking certain actions online.
Arunesh Mathur et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites, 3
PROC. ACM ON HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACT. 1 (2019).
232 John Naughton, How Amazon Puts Misinformation at the Top of Your Reading List, THE
GUARDIAN,
Aug.
8,
2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/08/amazon-algorithm-curatedmisinformation-books-data.
233 Jay Peters, A Snapchat-Owned Location App Just Added a Leaderboard Comparing Who Stays
Home
the
Most,
THE
VERGE,
(Mar.
24,
2020),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/24/21192741/snapchat-zenly-app-stay-at-homeleaderboard-coronavirus-social-distancing (discussing an app that typically encourages users
to share their location as much as possible).
234 HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans. 1991)
(arguing that a space is defined by what designers want to happen or not to happen in it).
235 HARTZOG, supra note 220, at 42.
236 Mark Zuckerberg, Bringing the World Closer Together, FACEBOOK (June 22, 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/bringing-the-world-closertogether/10154944663901634/. See also Helen A.S. Popkin, Privacy Is Dead on Facebook. Get
Over
It,
NBCNEWS.COM
(Jan.
13,
2010),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34825225/ns/technology_and_sciencetech_and_gadgets/t/privacy-dead-facebook-get-over-it (quoting Facebook’s privacy
guidance document as stating that “[m]aking connections—finding people you know,
learning about people, searching for what people are saying about topics that interest you—
is at the core of our product. This can only happen when people make their information
available and choose to share more openly.”).
237 Anabel Pasarow, How to Get More Matches on OkCupid, According to an Expert, REFINERY29
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multibillion-dollar femtech industry collects intimate data on its users and
often sells that data to third parties, while marketing its products as
enhancing women’s health and sexual enjoyment. And artificial intelligence
companies market their algorithms with highly dubious claims of predictive
accuracy, amplifying their “imperative” to collect data. 238
This has direct and deleterious effects on the ability of the Fourth
Amendment to protect privacy. When courts decline to resolve Fourth
Amendment cases on the merits because social norms are in flux, the norms
that eventually emerge will not be neutral or organically developed by
autonomous actors. Rather, those norms will be shaped by the companies
that control product marketing and design, filtered through those companies’
profit-maximizing interests. Over time, the process of nonintervention, antiprivacy norm formation, and judicial application of “settled” norms
systematically biases social norms against privacy.
We can observe a similar process unfolding in the lower courts. The
Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the privacy expectations, if any,
associated with social media accounts such as Facebook. In the absence of
clear direction, lower courts addressing the issue “have held that whether the
Fourth Amendment applies to a user’s Facebook content depends, inter alia,
on the user’s privacy settings.” 239 In practice, courts have placed a burden of
proof on defendants to demonstrate that their privacy settings are rigorous
enough to justify Fourth Amendment protection. 240 This would typically
(May 15, 2019), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/okcupid-profile-questions-matches.
238 See Danielle Keats Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1139,
1141 (2018).
239 United States v. Westley, No. 3:17-CR-171 (MPS), 2018 WL 3448161, at *6 (D. Conn.
July 17, 2018) (quoting United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y.
2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Khan, No. 15-cr-00286,
2017 WL 2362572, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2017) (holding that defendant could not claim a
Fourth Amendment violation where he did not maintain privacy restrictions on his
Facebook account).
240 Westley, 2018 WL 3448161, at *6 (“There is a spectrum of privacy settings available on
Facebook, and those settings can be tailored to specific types of communications…the
defendants have done nothing to show what, if any, privacy settings governed any of the
types of communications found in their accounts. Defendants have therefore not established
that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in any of the communications described in
the affidavits.”); United States v. Devers, No. 12-CR-50-JHP, 2012 WL 12540235, at *2
(N.D. Okla. Dec. 28, 2012) (“[U]nless the defendants can prove that their Facebook
accounts contained security settings which prevented anyone from accessing their accounts,
this court finds their legitimate expectation of privacy ended when they disseminated posts
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require more than just restricting Facebook posts to one’s friends. 241 But,
over the past fifteen years, Facebook has notoriously made it difficult for its
users to effectively use their privacy settings or limit the dissemination of
their posts. 242 Facebook’s anti-privacy design has thus helped to shape
surveillance-relevant practices and norms. And there is little question about
Facebook’s preferences for norms among its users—Mark Zuckerberg has
stated explicitly that keeping personal information private online is no longer
the “social norm.” 243 The company has also consistently advanced the legal
position that its users have no privacy interests in any information they share
with Facebook. 244 When the Supreme Court eventually weighs in on social
media privacy, it will do so in an environment shaped by Facebook and its
aggressively anti-privacy design and practices.
C. Surveillance Creep
Judicial norm-reliance and nonintervention also facilitate the process of
surveillance creep. 245 Surveillance creep is related to the engineering concept
“function creep,” where a device designed for one purpose ends up being
to their ‘friends’ because those ‘friends’ were free to use the information however they
wanted.”)
241 E.g., Palmieri v. United States, 896 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that the
government could obtain information shared with the defendant’s Facebook friends);
United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding no expectation
of privacy in posts sent to a defendant’s Facebook friends).
242
E.g.,
It’s
Time
to
Make
Our
Privacy
Tools
Easier
to
Find,
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/03/privacy-shortcuts (acknowledging that its privacy
settings remain difficult for many users to find);
Complaint,
In
re
Matter
of
Facebook,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookcmp
t.pdf, at ¶19–29 (describing how Facebook regularly manipulated and hid its privacy settings
to make it difficult or impossible for its users to restrict the dissemination of their
information).
243 Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, GUARDIAN (Jan.
10, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy.
244 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile
Litigation, 402 F.Supp.3d 767 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2019) (No. 18-MD-02843); Campbell v.
Facebook, Inc., 951 F.3d 1106, 1119 n.9 (9th Cir. 2020); Appellee’s Brief at 21, Smith v.
Facebook, Inc., 745 Fed. Appx. 8 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2017) (No. 17-16206),
https://epic.org/amicus/facebook/smith/Smith-v-Facebook-9th-Cir-Facebook-Brief.pdf.
245 BRETT M. FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 20-21
(2018).
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used for another purpose. 246 Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger give the
example of a driver’s license, which grew from a permission card for drivers
to a general form of identification. 247
Surveillance creep is a form of function creep that involves data
collection. It occurs when a device designed for one type of information
gathering ends up being used for other, often more invasive types of
information gathering. For example, wearable health trackers like FitBit or
Apple Watch may have originally been used to count steps, but they can also
be deployed by health insurance companies, schools, or workplaces to
determine eligibility for discounts, liability for injury, or access to
opportunities. Integrating GPS into a mobile dating app can tell users about
potential matches near them, but it can also be used to triangulate the precise
location of queer people hiding from abusive communities, families, or
governments. 248 And a camera at a four-way intersection may have originally
been installed to photograph the license plates of speeders or those who drive
through red lights. But once the cameras are in place, it becomes easier for
governments to use them to monitor pedestrians using facial recognition
technology.
Far from a hypothetical or speculative concern, these kinds of
surveillance creep are already here. During anti-racism protests in May and
June 2020, police in San Diego used streetlight sensors and cameras,
previously installed to capture transit and environmental data, to identify,
harass, and prosecute protestors. 249 And once an isolated security tool, face
scans are now being used in place of boarding passes at airports, with the
attendant databases of faces providing even more opportunities for
surveillance. 250 Existing tracking tools being repurposed for Covid-related
Bruce Schneier, Security and Function Creep, 8 IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY, 88, 88 (2010).
FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 245, at 20.
248 See, e.g., See, e.g., Rick Noack, Could Using Gay Dating App Grindr Get You Arrested in Egypt?,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
12,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/12/could-using-gaydating-app-grindr-get-you-arrested-in-egypt/; Mark Joseph Stern, This Daily Beast Grindr
Stunt Is Sleazy, Dangerous, and Wildly Unethical, SLATE (Aug. 11, 2016),
https://slate.com/technology/2016/08/the-daily-beasts-olympics-grindr-stunt-isdangerous-and-unethical.html.
249 Jesse Marx, Police Used Smart Streetlight Footage to Investigate Protesters, VOICE OF SAN
DIEGO (June 29, 2020), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/policeused-smart-streetlight-footage-to-investigate-protesters.
250 Dan Reed, Your Face Is Your Passport: Biometrics Could Enable Explosive Travel Growth, But
246
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contact tracing are another example of ever-expanding surveillance. 251
Surveillance creep has a subtle yet powerful impact on sociotechnical
norms because of its ability to normalize surveillance as ordinary, routine,
and expected. Data tracking in schools may offer administrators quantitative
metrics on which to evaluate student success, but its use habituates young
people to third-party data collection. 252 The launch of facial recognition
cameras in London prepares the ground for “wider public acceptance of a
… rights-hostile technology via a gradual building out process.” 253 GPS
technology may be helpful for tourists navigating new cities or to help drivers
find the fastest route home, but it also routinizes the experience of other
people knowing where you are at all times and adjusts our expectations about
others’ access to our data. 254 It is also relatively easy for information age
devices to take on new surveillance capabilities: tablets, wearables, mobile
apps, and so-called “smart” devices can be updated via wireless uploads in
the background while no one is looking. 255 This contrasts with the significant
effort involved in updating industrial age devices; installing a CD player or
an airbag or a sunroof in an old car, for example, required a trip to a repair
shop, physical deconstruction, and reconstruction. Whereas the obvious
effort involved in the latter emphasized the significance of the change, the
ease of the former suggests its ordinariness.
By relying on precedents involving older technologies to justify the use
of newer, more advanced surveillance, courts unwittingly leverage the
normalization effect of surveillance creep in Fourth Amendment cases. For
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example, in United States v. White, 256 the Supreme Court ruled that undercover
agents could record private conversations inside a suspect’s home, relying on
prior rulings permitting undercover agents without recording devices to enter
a home. 257 Because the additional intrusion of a recording device was
relatively small, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy against it. 258
Once one form of surveillance got its foot in the door of people’s homes,
additional surveillance became easier to justify.
In United States v. Forrester, 259 the Ninth Circuit held that government
agents could monitor an individual’s internet account and capture his email
to/from data, the IP addresses of the websites he visited, and the total
volume of data sent to his account. 260 A prior case had allowed the police to
use a device known as a “pen register” to tap a suspect’s phone lines and
collect the numbers that he dialed. 261 Given the legality of telephone pen
registers, the government could “install a pen register analogue” to monitor
a person’s internet traffic without triggering the Fourth Amendment. 262 The
court ignored the substantially greater quantity and intimacy of internet
data, 263 concluding instead that internet users do not reasonably expect
privacy in their internet use any more than they do in their telephone use. 264
In each of these cases, the Court’s approval of early forms of
surveillance was used to justify the subsequent use of more advanced forms
of surveillance. The Court presumed that individuals had accepted
surveillance as normal, and then allowed government monitoring to creep
one step further.

401 U.S. 745 (1971)
Id. at 751 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300–303 (1966)). White confirmed
the continuing validity of the outcome of Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), which
held, under pre-Katz law, that an undercover agent could carry a recording device. Id. at 439.
258 Id. at 752 (“[T]here is no persuasive evidence that the difference in this respect between
the electronically equipped and the unequipped agent is substantial enough to require
discrete constitutional recognition.”).
259 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008).
260 Id. at 504–05.
261 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
262 Forrester, 512 F.3d at 505.
263 See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2105, 2149–51 (2009) (describing the revealing nature of internet IP addresses and data
volume information).
264 Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510.
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IV. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
Courts’ reliance on existing norms, and failure to intervene in cases
where norms are unsettled, have led to several substantial errors in Fourth
Amendment law. That is not to say that norms have no place in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. But rather than simply adopting existing norms,
courts should examine whether those norms are justifiable. And whether
courts choose to get involved in the social construction of surveillance
technologies or to stay out of the fray, they must do so appreciating the net
surveillant effects of nonintervention.
Sociotechnical norms develop in an arena already skewed in favor of
surveillance. When courts avoid intervening where norms are in flux, the
mechanisms of design and surveillance creep remain in place. It is true that
technology companies are not the only institutions involved in the social
construction of new technologies. But they are the most powerful: Scholars
have shown that individuals are, on average, ill-equipped to resist designedin nudges on their own, 265 and the community of privacy advocacy
organizations are too small and underfunded to match the power of
corporate interests. The law’s intervention down the line can only do so
much, tweaking or adjusting a marginal change even as the wave of prosurveillance norms continue unchallenged. Instead, if the goal is to achieve
an equilibrium between privacy and law enforcement needs, sociotechnical
norms need a counterweight. 266
Courts are well-suited to provide this counterweight. Although
courts’ institutional interests are manifold, 267 those interests are generally not
the same as the data-extractive interests of technology companies. Courts are
also capable of stepping back, conceptualizing the balance between law
enforcement and liberty, and making a dispassionate decision in keeping with
See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 220, at 263; DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST
(1st ed. 2011).
266 The quest for equilibrium is not new in Fourth Amendment law. As Orin Kerr has argued,
the relationship between law and technology seems to be one of “equilibrium adjustment.”
Kerr, supra note 24, at 480. In practice, acting as a counterweight to the surveillant interests
of technology companies involves starting from the baseline that social norms, whether
perceived as settled or in flux, are often going to tilt toward disclosure.
267 See, e.g., Diana Kapiszewski, Tactical Balancing: High Court Decision Making on Politically Crucial
Cases, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 471, 477–78 (2011) (describing the judiciary’s institutional interests
as, among other things, protecting judges’ power, the scope of judicial review, and push back
against encroachment from other branches).
265

AND SLOW

45

what Daniel Meltzer once called the “special attributes of the judiciary.” 268
And courts are capable of protecting the rights of minority groups that lack
sufficient voices in majoritarian politics. 269 By questioning the
appropriateness of “settled” norms and intervening to protect citizens faced
with new data-extractive technologies, courts may serve as a valuable
counterweight to the anti-privacy interests of governments and technology
companies.
In the following sections, we explore new directions for Fourth
Amendment law that can help courts to intervene effectively in cases
involving new technologies and avoid excessive norm reliance. We first
examine the use of alternative Fourth Amendment paradigms that would
allow courts to focus on the effects of surveillance rather than existing social
norms. In addition, we propose that courts use a modified form of stare
decisis in Fourth Amendment cases involving emerging surveillance
technologies, a field in which new approaches may be needed more often
than in other areas of constitutional law. 270 Finally, we survey alternative
institutional arrangements for regulating government surveillance and
consider how legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts might work
together to effectively regulate government surveillance.
A. New Fourth Amendment Paradigms
Courts rely on existing social norms in virtually every aspect of Fourth
Amendment law, as they seek objective bases for their rulings on surveillance
and policing. Dominant doctrinal paradigms facilitate this reliance on norms.
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the reasonableness-based
Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and
Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 288 (1988).
269 See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts,
129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2062-63 (2016). This is particularly important in the Fourth
Amendment context, which is part of a criminal justice system that disproportionately
burdens Black and brown communities. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING
BLACK MEN (2017); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006). For the classic discussion of courts’ comparative
advantages in adjudicating public law issues, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1307 (1976).
270 Our argument does not critique the doctrine of stare decisis, generally. That discussion is
beyond the scope of this Article.
268
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standards for investigative stops and non-physical seizures encourage courts
to act as armchair sociologists, identifying and analyzing common social
practices.
There are, however, alternative paradigms that would largely avoid
reliance on social norms. In place of the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard for searches, scholars have proposed approaches that are more
prescriptive and that focus on the effects of surveillance rather than its social
valence. These include tests that overtly balance the chilling effects and
psychological harms of surveillance against its benefits, 271 multi-factor tests
that identify constitutionally problematic forms of government
observation, 272 and tests that focus on the intimacy, amount, and cost of a
given act of surveillance. 273 Scholars have also suggested alternative
paradigms for Fourth Amendment reasonableness, including graduated tiers
of reasonableness that offer a more nuanced approach to different kinds of
government surveillance, 274 or partially randomized searches that reduce
police discretion and racial discrimination. 275
By directly examining the effects or intensity of surveillance, and not
just its acceptance by society, these prescriptive approaches can lessen
reliance on social norms in Fourth Amendment law. 276 Prescriptive
paradigms for Fourth Amendment searches are also more compatible with
Tokson, supra note 65, at 744. See also Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to
Increase the Productivity of the Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 554 (2013)
(providing a general theory of cost-benefit analysis in surveillance regulation).
272 See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3,
61–70 (2007) (discussing factors that make government observation especially worthy of
regulation); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party
Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 985–1014 (2007) (listing
considerations that lower courts have found relevant to privacy). See also Joel R. Reidenberg,
Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 155–57 (2014) (proposing a normative regime
based on whether surveilled behavior is of private or public concern).
273 Tokson, supra note 88, at 4.
274 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007); Alan Rozenshtein, Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE L.J. F. 943, 952 (2019).
275 Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 809, 811 (2011).
276 Tokson, supra note 65, at 758–69 (examining the chilling effects of surveillance on
activities, its harm to relationships, and direct psychological harms caused by observation);
Freiwald, supra note 272, at 61–70 (examining the hidden, intrusive, indiscriminate, and
continuous nature of surveillance).
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early judicial interventions addressing new surveillance technologies, because
they are more adaptable to rapidly changing circumstances. 277 Moreover,
many of these paradigms can help courts better address surveillance creep. 278
Rather than relying on sociotechnical norms, these paradigms focus on the
broader impacts of government surveillance activities. As such, whether a
surveillance practice uses familiar infrastructure matters less under these
approaches than under norm-reliant paradigms. 279 These approaches can
accordingly help avoid the normalizing effects of incremental surveillance
expansion.
In addition, courts adopting prescriptive approaches to Fourth
Amendment law can take the possibility of surveillance creep into account
when assessing a new surveillance technology. If a new technology
establishes a surveillance infrastructure that could easily be used for
additional types of information gathering, that should weigh in favor of
stronger Fourth Amendment regulation of the technology. 280 For example, if
license plate reading cameras, which may not themselves capture very
sensitive data, could be repurposed to collect facial recognition data or
infrared scans of car interiors, that should be a factor in a court’s decision to
approve the cameras. Because additional uses of existing infrastructure are
difficult to monitor, courts may be more effective at limiting the
development of pervasive surveillance infrastructure in the first instance. 281
Of course, these types of forward-looking assessments of surveillance
277 See, e.g., Tokson, supra note 65, at 779–80 (describing the ability of a normative balancing
approach to accommodate novel surveillance technologies without being disrupted in the
manner of property tests or the reasonable expectation of privacy test). Historical and textbased approaches to Fourth Amendment search law may also avoid reliance on social norms,
albeit at the cost of substantially underprotecting privacy and security relative to existing law.
See, e.g., id. at 798–801.
278 See supra Part III.C These paradigms include prescriptive balancing tests of harms and
benefits, multi-factor tests geared towards assessing new technologies, and graduated tiers
of reasonableness. See supra notes 271–275.
279 See supra notes 253–264, 276 and accompanying text.
280 Such an approach would embody the spirit of Justice Brandeis’s famous dissent in
Olmstead v. United States, where he reminded the Court that “in the application of a
Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be.” 277
U.S. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373
(1910)).
281 See David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 62, 72 (2013) (proposing that courts examine surveillance based on its potential rather
than the actual information gathered).

48

technologies may be difficult for courts, which are often limited in their
technical knowledge and institutional capacity for balancing complex
factors. 282 Moreover, the conservative ideological tilt of the federal courts
might skew judicial decisions in favor of law enforcement interests. 283 As we
discuss in Part IV.C, another way to proactively address surveillance creep is
to explore alternative institutional structures for surveillance regulation.
B. Flexibility and Stare Decisis
Several current Supreme Court Justices have put forth theories about
stare decisis and when it should dictate case outcomes. 284 While the power of
stare decisis to actually bind Justices is contested, 285 the Court stands by its
precedents far more often than it overrules them. 286 The force of precedent
can deter the Justices from questioning prior erroneous decisions, 287
influence the Court’s grants of certiorari, 288 and shape the cases that litigants
appeal to the Court in the first place. 289
Whatever its general power, stare decisis may be disfavored in certain
situations, such as when a prior decision has proven unworkable, 290 or when
individuals are unlikely to rely on a prior decision in allocating resources. 291
Our analysis above suggests another area in which judges should be especially
willing to overturn existing precedents: cases involving surveillance
technologies and related social practices. Courts should be willing to
intervene when government entities employ a novel technology, even if the
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 857–87 (2004); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 944 (1987).
283 See Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148,
160-63 (2019).
284 E.g., Nina Varsava, Precedent on Precedent, 168 U. PENN. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming
2020); Will Baude, Precedent and Discretion, 2020 Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming).
285 Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis: Rhetoric and Reality at the Supreme Court, 2018 SUP. CT.
REV. 121, 131–32.
286 Baude, supra note 284, at 4.
287 Id.
288 Schauer, supra note 285, at 135.
289 Id.
290 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992);
Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1983–84 (Thomas, J., concurring).
291 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 854; Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 13 (1989).
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norms and practices surrounding the technology remain in flux. 292 But given
the possibility of judicial error in such cases, courts should embed flexibility
in their Fourth Amendment decisions. 293 They should recognize that
changing technological and social circumstances often necessitate overruling
prior cases in this area. 294
Judicial opinions might explicitly point towards flexibility by stating that
their decisions may not apply if certain circumstances change. 295 But the
future of technology and social norm development is difficult to predict. 296
A better approach might simply be to recognize that judicial precedents
involving surveillance technology may require reexamination when
circumstances shift or when courts have the benefit of hindsight. 297 Relatedly,
the Supreme Court could facilitate challenges to Fourth Amendment
precedents by making clear that a defendant who successfully overturns a
precedent will be able to exclude evidence gathered in reliance on the
overturned decision. 298 Limiting the “good faith” exception for officers who
See supra Part II.
Cf. Kerr, supra note 24, at 539 (discussing the possibility of flexibility in Fourth
Amendment law but arguing instead for a practice of nonintervention).
294 Cf. id. at 541–42 (discussing overrulings and the current difficulty of challenging
precedents in the Fourth Amendment context).
295 See id. at 541.
296 One example of a court issuing a tentative, flexible ruling is Kyllo v. United States, where
the Court noted that its decision might not apply if infrared cameras entered into general
public use. 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). Kyllo’s reliance on social practices to determine the scope
of the Fourth Amendment, while reflecting flexibility, also leaves individuals vulnerable to
the erosion of constitutional protections if sociotechnical norms trend against homeowner
privacy. For the reasons discussed above, see supra Part III, this norm-reliant approach is
flawed.
297 The overruling of Olmstead v. United States is an example of this phenomenon, as the
Supreme Court in 1967 overturned a 1928 decision permitting warrantless wiretapping after
several decades of government abuses and widespread monitoring of citizens began to come
to light. See Tokson, supra note 217, at 583–84 (describing the FBI’s post-Olmstead
wiretapping and bugging program). While Katz’s recognition of the flawed nature of Olmstead
was long delayed, a greater willingness to overturn Fourth Amendment precedents involving
surveillance technology might have hastened the overruling of Olmstead and substantially
reduced the severe abuses of government surveillance powers under the prior regime. See id.
(describing the government’s exploitation of information gathered through wiretapping,
including monitoring political groups, influencing judicial appointments, threatening civil
rights leaders, and coercing members of Congress).
298 The ability of a defendant who successfully gets a precedent overturned at the Supreme
Court to suppress evidence unlawfully gathered is ambiguous after Davis v. United States, 564
292
293
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rely on existing law may be necessary to incentivize litigants to challenge
questionable precedents. 299
Lower courts, too, should be empowered to take account of changing
circumstances or unworkable higher-court decisions in the Fourth
Amendment context. Lower courts sometimes apply binding precedents
narrowly, shaping the law’s application and signaling to appellate courts that
a precedent may be erroneous or otherwise flawed. 300 This “precedential
dialogue” should be encouraged in the Fourth Amendment context, where
early interventions by higher courts may require revision over time. 301
Appeals courts can monitor lower court narrowing and use it to identify
precedents ripe for reexamination. 302 They might also encourage
experimentation by expressly stating that lower courts will have a role in
implementing a new standard or by citing lower court disagreements in
opinions overturning prior decisions. 303 By embedding flexibility in their
decisions involving new technologies, courts can intervene to shape
sociotechnical norms and prevent unchecked government surveillance while
minimizing judicial errors over time.
C. Alternative Institutional Structures
A growing body of scholarship argues that new legislative approaches
and administrative structures can help courts govern the sprawling
surveillance systems of law enforcement. 304 Daphna Renan has suggested
U.S. 229 (2011). Davis held that a defendant could not suppress evidence obtained under a
precedent that was later overturned, because officers had obtained that evidence in good
faith reliance on existing law. Id. at 249–50. The Court left open the possibility that the
defendant who personally challenged the precedent could obtain suppression of evidence,
as a sort of incentive for successfully challenging erroneous precedents. Id. at 248.
299 See id.
300 Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 925–27
(2016); see also Tokson, supra note 66, at 40–41 & n. 218 (discussing examples of lower courts
narrowing or modifying constitutional doctrines).
301 Re, supra note 300, at 927.
302 Id.
303 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234–35 (2009) (citing lower court criticism of Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), as a basis for overruling it).
304 Renan, supra note 64, at 1044–45. See also Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal
Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement
Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 534 (2013) (arguing that “an approach of collaborative
constitutionality” between the Court and Congress “is necessary to achieve optimal levels

51

that an independent administrative agency—like a more robust Privacy and
Civil Liberties Board—can make a “programmatic probable cause
determination” that situates a given incident of a search or seizure within the
wider ecosystem of law enforcement surveillance. 305 This would allow
standardized procedures and built-in expertise, the hallmarks of a functioning
administrative state, to put limits on surveillance at the systems stage.
Administrative rules can also supplement the judiciary’s efforts to nudge
sociotechnical norms by adding an additional “point of entry” for law—
judicial review “at the level of program design.” 306 This allows the law to use
its expressive power not just on a single incident of surveillance, but also on
the structures that support it.
To implement this, scholars suggest that courts direct their decisions to
policymakers, calling on them to write rules that prevent recurring injustice
in addition to speaking directly to police on the ground. 307 Such a structure
could combine the prophylactic rules of cases like Miranda v. Arizona 308 with
broader directives to legislatures to change police procedures, as seen in cases
like United States v. Wade. 309 This could represent a sea change in how courts
frame their opinions, 310 and there are epistemic and practical reasons why
calling on policymakers to write prescriptive rules might help courts act as
counterweights to anti-privacy norms. Agencies may have greater expertise,
particularly regarding the whole picture of law enforcement’s surveillance
systems, than common law courts making one-off decisions every once in a
while. 311 Agencies can also write prescriptive rules and engage in nimble
policy experimentation, allowing them to adjust proposals as they observe
the downstream consequences of their actions. 312
for protecting privacy”).
305 Renan, supra note 64, at 1112–114.
306 Id. at 1092.
307 See John Rappaport, Second Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CAL. L. REV. 205, 210–
11 (2015).
308 384 U.S. 436 (1966). As John Rappaport notes, Miranda is a good example of courts
speaking both to officers and to policymakers. The decision includes the case’s famous prearrest warnings and a call to policymakers to develop procedural safeguards. Rappaport,
supra note 307, at 224-25.
309 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (directing legislatures to change suspect line-up procedures).
310 Id. at 216–18 (describing how the vast majority of criminal procedure cases are directed
toward front line officers).
311 Rappaport, supra note 307, at 232–33.
312 Id. at 234, 236.
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Lawmakers can also shape social norms relevant to privacy by
influencing corporate behavior. This is at least one of the goals of the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the European Union’s comprehensive
data protection law. 313 It provides EU citizens with a litany of rights to their
data, including rights to access, correct, delete, and transport their data,
among others. 314 In addition, the GDPR imposes procedural and compliance
obligations on companies as they collect and process data from their
customers. Companies have to hire Data Protection Officers (DPOs) to
oversee and ensure corporate compliance with the law. 315 They also have to
keep extensive data processing records, which can be requisitioned by
regulators during an investigation. 316 And, in certain circumstances, the
GDPR requires regulated organizations to conduct impact assessments
about data processing and collection and platform design. 317 These internal
requirements are supposed to give companies a standard protocol for
assessing privacy risks. But, as Margot Kaminski suggests, they are also
supposed to affect how companies conceptualize their data privacy
obligations, nudging them by keeping privacy front of mind during the design
and compliance processes. 318
This form of “collaborative governance” is incomplete. It allows
regulated entities to be directly involved in the creation, interpretation, and
application of what the law actually requires, undermining the law’s ability to
achieve its social ends. 319 Nor are administrative agencies likely to effectively
regulate surveillance on their own; agencies can be politicized and subject to
regulatory capture. 320 But agencies need not work alone. An effective system
of governance requires agencies, legislatures, and the courts: the former two
can write rules while engaged with a systemic review of the criminal justice
system, and the latter can apply judicial review to those rules. 321 This
GDPR, supra note 152, arts. 28, 39(1)(b).
Id. at arts. 12–23, 39–47.
315 Id. at art. 37-39, 55–56.
316 Id. at art. 30, 50–51.
317 Id. at art. 35, 53–54.
318 See Kaminski, supra note 157, 1603–05.
319 See LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC
CIVIL RIGHTS (2016); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV.
773, 787–88 (2020).
320 See, e.g., RORY V. LOO, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of
Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1624 (2019).
321 Renan, supra note 64, at 1125–26.
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collaboration can offer additional means through which regulatory power can
counterbalance technologies’ designed-in surveillance norms.

CONCLUSION
Prevailing social norms often determine the direction of Fourth
Amendment law. Courts and scholars have lauded norm reliance as judicial
humility in the face of rapidly changing technology. This Article has
challenged that conventional wisdom in two respects. It has shown that the
practice of judicial reliance on social norms is more nuanced than previously
understood: courts rely on them when they appear to have settled, but decline
to get involved when social norms, particularly those about new surveillance
technologies, are still being contested. This Article has also shown how
current adjudicative paradigms undermine the promise of the Fourth
Amendment. By adopting existing norms without questioning whether they
are justifiable, courts have embedded discriminatory concepts in Fourth
Amendment law. And nonintervention leaves sociotechnical norms to
develop in accordance with the data extractive interests of technology
companies. As courts remain on the sidelines, our privacy slips away: we
become inured to the perceived normalcy of surveillance practices, and new
technologies creep more and more toward surveillance. Whether we can
reverse course with new judicial and institutional approaches is an open
question. But we can start by understanding the risks of the Fourth
Amendment’s current relationship with social norms and envisioning a
different path.
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